
T H E

LONDON REVIEW,

FOR JANUARY, 1778.

Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit. To which is added, The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter; with its Influence on Christianity, especially with respect to the Doctrine of the Pre-existence of Christ. By Joseph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 8vo. 5s. Johnson.

It may appear something extraordinary, says Dr. Priestley, but it is strictly true, that but a very few years ago, I was so far from having any thoughts of writing on the subject of this publication, that I had not even adopted the opinion contended for in it.—It would, indeed, be somewhat extraordinary in any other writer than Dr. Priestley; but that facility of penetration, which distinguishes his intuitive genius in the investigation of his subject, joined to that rapidity of composition which attends his illustration of it, render nothing of this kind extraordinary in him. Nay, so versatile is the pen of this ready writer that, we should not think it extraordinary, if in the course of years, to which Providence will probably prolong his “*literary life*,” it should successively point, like a weather-cock, in rotation, to every point in the compass of the Cyclopædia. Ordinary geniuses may occasionally console themselves with the maxim *Non omnia possumus omnes*. Dr. Priestley hath no need of such confined consolation; wanting nothing but Time to develope the mysteries of the whole circle

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Doubtless, in so doing he has honoured me greatly; but then, it seems, the pinch is, he will not notice the repeated *letters* addressed to him by Dr. Kenrick*. Why he does it not, is not my business to examine; though, I believe, I could assign the real reason†. Of this then I complain, because I think it ungenerous, that you should so pertinaciously exert yourself to ruin the reputation of a young writer, who really thinks very humbly of his own merit and abilities.‡ But this I must add, that I begin to value myself as a writer much more than I ever did.¶ It cannot be that Dr. Kenrick would, almost every month, take the trouble to mention an author, or even to recollect his idea, whose abilities were in the lowest degree contemptible, or whose style of writing was rapid and insignificant.§ So much I thought proper to say to you, not indeed from any expectation that I should for the future be treated with more lenity, but merely that I might tell you how little I suspected, when I wrote my *letters*, that I should rouse your indignation; and that I must think your present conduct exceedingly ungenerous, after the very severe critique you officially published, and especially as that critique was so singularly partial**. I am, with respect, Sir,

Portman-Square,

June 16, 1778.

Your obedient humble servant,

THE AUTHOR.

* This correspondent must know little of the self-sufficiency of professed critics, not to know that, however *he* may look up to such a writer as Dr. P., they look down on all book-makers.

† The reason was given in Dr. K.'s first letter, in which he declared he never expected an answer: for which he believes he can give a still better reason than this correspondent. Doctor P. can have no answer to make, till he knows more of the subject: and there is *no book* yet published that will inform him.

‡ The editor is the last man in the world that would hurt the reputation of a young writer, especially so modest a one as this gentleman affects to be: but while an author remains *anonymous*, how is his reputation affected? Granting this writer had a literary reputation to lose, how should the Reviewer know it? Besides the matter in question related to a *philosophical truth* and not to *literary abilities*.

¶ The editor is sorry for this. Over-weening merit is more ridiculous than modest want of worth.

§ This, we say again, is not the point in question. It is not as a *writer* but as a *philosopher* that this author was criticized. It is also owing only to the repeated notice Dr. P. took of him that he has been repeatedly mentioned in our Review. Dr. K. never went out of his way to seek such an antagonist.

** Dr. K. noticed every thing in the *Letters*, which he thought merited it. If the critique was unjust, our correspondent should defend his book.—He shall have room allowed him in the London Review, for that purpose. If it was not unjust, and the writer cannot defend his arguments, why not frankly and fairly confess it? Does he adopt Dr. P.'s confessed maxim, never to retract what he once publicly advances in print?

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T H E

LONDON REVIEW,

FOR JANUARY, 1778.

Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit. To which is added, The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter; with its Influence on Christianity, especially with respect to the Doctrine of the Pre-existence of Christ. By Joseph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S.
8vo. 5s. Johnson.

It may appear something extraordinary, says Dr. Priestley, but it is strictly true, that but a very few years ago, I was so far from having any thoughts of writing on the subject of this publication, that I had not even adopted the opinion contended for in it.—It would, indeed, be somewhat extraordinary in any other writer than Dr. Priestley; but that facility of penetration, which distinguishes his intuitive genius in the investigation of his subject, joined to that rapidity of composition which attends his illustration of it, render nothing of this kind extraordinary in him. Nay, so versatile is the pen of this ready writer that, we should not think it extraordinary, if in the course of years, to which Providence will probably prolong his “*literary life*,” it should successively point, like a weather-cock, in rotation, to every point in the compass of the Cyclopaedia. Ordinary geniuses may occasionally console themselves with the maxim *Non omnia possumus omnes*. Dr. Priestley hath no need of such confined consolation; wanting nothing but Time to develop the mysteries of the whole circle

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B

of

of arts and sciences. Hence he has declaredly chosen, for his coat of arms, that significant motto, *Ars longa, vita brevis*. For the sake of the arts, therefore, we say, Long life to him!—At the same time, we cannot help remarking a little peevishness of disposition in him, that seems to promise it; although we think it, by no means, a symptom of that philosophical fortitude of mind, which generally characterizes true genius. After complaining against the hardship of being treated “as a notorious plagiarist” for pilfering a spark of light, a pinch of phlogiston, and a puff of fresh air, from poor Dr. Higgins; he proceeds, in repeating his grievances, as follows. “There are even many persons, not destitute of name and character themselves, who cannot bear to hear me spoken of, as having any pretensions to philosophy, without a sneer; and who think my publications on the subject a disgrace to philosophy, and to my country.”

We wish the Doctor had told us who these very sagacious personages are, that affect to treat his doctorial dignity with such superior *hauteur*. We might then probably account for their being themselves possessed of name and character as philosophers. For, truth to say, we know numbers, who have somehow or other wriggled themselves into such possession without any legitimate claim. We would venture a wager that the reputed wise-acres, Doctor Priestley here hints at, are some of his unsisterly brethren, the old women among the fellows of the Royal Society. The way these goodies get a character is well known, and easy enough. In the first place they cling, like other weak bodies, together; and vouch for each other, like thieves at the Old Bailey, or vagabonds at a Register-office. At the worst, let any of the sisterhood get a catarrh by watching Jupiter's satellites, the cramp in the wrist by working an electrical wheel, or the mopes by keeping a register of the wind and weather; and immediately they are dubbed *doctissima sorores*, and take rank and character among the philosophers of the age. We are sorry to think a man, of Dr. P's superior eminence, can be affected at the sneers of such persons as these. A supercilious look from a truly *homo emuncta naris* might indeed affect the profoundest philosopher; but the affected contempt, of *such fellows* as these, is beneath notice.

While we declare our admiration, however, of Dr. Priestley's acuteness of penetration and readiness of expression, we are not blind to those defects, which are the usual concomitants of celerity; especially in treating subjects that require consummate experience and critical contemplation.—But of these elsewhere, and in another manner. At present we shall
confine

confine ourselves to the design and execution of the disquisitions before us. That we may not misrepresent them, also, we shall lay down the former in the author's own words.

"Lest any person should hastily misapprehend the *nature*, or *importance*, of the questions discussed in this treatise, or the manner in which I have decided for myself with respect to them, I shall here state the several subjects of inquiry as concisely, and with as much distinctness, as I can, and also inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are.

"It has generally been supposed that there are *two distinct kinds of substance* in human nature, and they have been distinguished by the terms *matter* and *spirit*, or *mind*. The former of these has been said to be possessed of the property of *extension*, viz. of length, breadth, and thickness, and also of *solidity* or *impenetrability*, and consequently of a *vis inertiae*; but it is said to be naturally destitute of all other powers whatever. The latter has of late been defined to be a substance intirely destitute of all *extension*, or *relation to space*, so as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly *immaterial*, but to be possessed of the powers of *perception*, *intelligence*, and *self-motion*.

"Matter is that kind of substance of which our *bodies* are composed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is said to reside in a *spirit*, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the Divine Being, are said to be purely immaterial.

"It is maintained in this treatise, that neither *matter* nor *spirit* (meaning by the latter the subject of sense and thought) correspond to the definitions above mentioned. For that matter is not that *inert* substance that it has been supposed to be; that *powers of attraction* or *repulsion* are necessary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be *impenetrable* to other parts. I therefore define it to be a substance possessed of the property of *extension*, and of *powers of attraction* or *repulsion*. And since it has never yet been asserted that the powers of *sensation* and *thought* are incompatible with these (*solidity*, or *impenetrability*, and consequently a *vis inertiae*, only, having been thought to be repugnant to them), I therefore maintain that we have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct from each other, as have been represented.

"It is likewise maintained in this treatise, that the notion of two substances that have no *common property*, and yet are capable of *intimate connection* and *mutual action* is both absurd and *modern*; a substance without extension or relation to place being unknown both in the scriptures, and to all antiquity; the human mind for example, having till lately been thought to have a proper *presence in the body*, and a *proper motion* together with it; and the Divine Mind having always been represented as being, truly and properly, *omnipresent*.

"It is maintained, however, in the Sequel of this treatise, that such a distinction as the ancient philosophers *did* make between *matter* and *spirit*, though it was by no means such a distinction as was defined above (which does not admit of their having any common property), but a distinction which made the Supreme Mind the author of all good,

4 *Priestley's Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit.*

and matter the source of all evil, that all inferior intelligences are *emanations from the Supreme Mind*, or made out of its substance, and that matter was reduced to its present form not by the Supreme Mind itself, but by *another intelligence*, a peculiar emanation from it, has been the real source of the greatest corruptions of true religion in all ages, many of which remain to this very day; that this *system of philosophy* and the *true system of revelation* have always been diametrically opposite, and hostile to each other; and that the latter can never be firmly established but upon the ruins of the former.

“To promote this firm establishment of the system of *pure Revelation*, in opposition to that of a vain and absurd *philosophy*, here shewn to be so, is the true object of this work; in the perusal of which I beg the candour and patient attention of the judicious and philosophical reader.”

The disquisitions, or first part of this work, are divided into eighteen sections; the distinct subjects of which may be gathered from the titles.

SECT. I. Of the nature and essential Properties of Matter.

SECT. II. Of Impenetrability, as ascribed to Matter.

SECT. III. Of the Seat of the Sentient Principle in Man, proving that it does not reside in an immaterial Substance.

SECT. IV. Additional Considerations in Favour of the Materiality of the Human Soul.

SECT. V. Advantages attending the System of Materialism, especially with respect to the Doctrines of revealed Religion.

SECT. VI. Considerations more immediately relating to immaterial Substances, and especially to the Connexion of the Soul and Body.—PART I. Of the Presence of the Soul with the Body.—PART II. Of the mutual Influences of the Soul and the Body.

SECT. VII. Of the Vehicle of the Soul.

SECT. VIII. Objections to the System of Materialism considered.

SECT. IX. Of the Objection to the System of Materialism derived from the Consideration of the Divine Essence.

SECT. X. Of the Principles of Human Nature according to the Scriptures.

SECT. XI. Of the Divine Essence according to the Scriptures.

SECT. XII. Of the Arguments for the Being and Perfections of God, on the System of Materialism.

SECT. XIII. Observations on Personal Identity with respect to the future State of Man.

SECT. XIV. Of the Origin of the popular Opinions concerning the Soul.

SECT. XV. A View of the different Opinions that have been held, concerning the Divine Essence, especially with a View to the Doctrine of Immateriality.

SECT. XVI. An Account of the different Opinions that have been maintained concerning the Soul.—PART I. The Opinions of the Heathens and Jews.—PART II. The Opinions of the Christian Fathers to the sixth Century.—PART III. The State of Opinions from the Sixth Century to the Time of Descartes.—PART IV. The State of Opinions from the Time of Descartes to the present,

SECT.

SECT. XVII. A brief History of Opinions concerning the State of the Dead.

SECT. XVIII. An Account of Opinions concerning the Sentient Principle in Brutes.

As we could not, with any propriety, enter into the particulars of our author's system, even in an abstract, without being led to controvert his principles; and as Dr. Kenrick has declared his intention of doing this more fully in a series of letters, to be published in our Review; we shall here pass over the physical part of the argument respecting the nature and properties of matter: contenting ourselves, and we hope, for the present, satisfying our readers with a few extracts, from the more generally understood, and therefore more generally pleasing, part of the argument.

Of the Principles of Human Nature, according to the Scriptures, Dr. Priestley observes that,

"Had man consisted of *two parts*, so essentially different from each other as *matter* and *spirit* are now represented to be, and had the immaterial been the principal part, and the material system only subservient to it, it might have been expected that there would have been some express mention of it, or declaration concerning it (this being a thing of so much consequence to us) in the *scriptures*, which contain the history of the creation, mortality, and resurrection of man. And yet there is not only a most remarkable silence on the subject of the immateriality of the human soul in these sacred books, even where we should most naturally have expected some account of it, but many things are there advanced, which unavoidably lead us to form a different conclusion; and nothing can be found in those books to countenance the vulgar opinion, except a few passages ill translated, or ill understood, standing in manifest contradiction to the uniform tenor of the rest."

After quoting a number of passages from Scripture, and explaining them in a manner agreeable to his system, our author proceeds thus.

"It is so evidently the doctrine of the scriptures, that the state of retribution does not take place till after the general resurrection, that it is now adopted by great numbers, who, nevertheless, cannot be brought to give up the notion of an immaterial soul. But I wish they would consider what notion they really have of an immaterial soul passing thousands of years without a single idea or sensation. In my opinion, it approaches very nearly to its being *no substance at all*; just as matter must intirely vanish, when we take away its property of *extension*."

"If, together with the opinion of the intire cessation of thought; they will maintain the real *existence* of the soul, it must be for the sake of the *hypothesis* only, and for no real *use* whatever. They who maintain that, without a resurrection, there is a sufficient reward for virtue, and a state of punishment for vice, taking place immediately after death, have a *solid reason* for contending for an immaterial principle, unaffected by the catastrophe to which the body is subject. But I can
 see

see no reason in the world why any *christian*, who, as such, necessarily believes the doctrine of a resurrection (this being the proper fundamental article of his faith), should be so zealous for it; and, indeed, why he should not be rather *jealous* of such a notion, as interfering with his *proper system*, superseding it, and making it *superfluous*, and really *undesirable*. The doctrine of a separate soul most evidently embarrasses the true christian system, which takes no sort of notice of it, and is uniform and consistent without it. In the scriptures, the heathens are represented to be *without hope*, and all mankind as *perishing* at death, if there be no *resurrection of the dead*.

“Persons who attend to the scriptures cannot avoid concluding, that the *operations* of the soul depend upon the body; and that between death and the resurrection there will be a *suspension* of all its powers. And it is obvious to remark, that if this be the fact, there must be a sufficient *natural reason* why it should be so; and, therefore, there is fair ground to presume, that the soul cannot be that *independent being* that has been imagined.

“According to the christian system, the body is necessary to all the *perceptions* and *exertions* of the mind: and if this be the case, what *evidence* can there be that it is not dependent upon the body for its *existence* also? that is, what evidence can there be that the faculty of thinking does not inhere in the body itself, and that there is no such thing as a *soul* separate from it? A philosopher, on seeing these appearances, would more naturally conclude that the body appeared to have greater powers than he imagined it could have had, than that an immaterial spirit could be so necessarily dependant upon a gross body, as not to be able to perceive or think without it. This appears to me, on the first face of things, to be by much the more natural conclusion, exclusive of the obligation that all philosophers are under, not to admit more *causes* than are absolutely *necessary*.

“But the most extraordinary assertion that I have yet met with, relating to the subject, is, that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is necessary to be established, before any regard can be paid to the scripture doctrine of a resurrection. For it is said, “that if the soul be not naturally capable of surviving the body, or if death is “unavoidably its *destruction*, then the resurrection must be the resurrection of what was *not in being*, the resurrection of *nothing*.” It is true that a *property* such as I consider the *power of thinking* to be, cannot exist without its *substance*, which is an organized system. But if this property of thinking necessarily attends the property of *life*, nothing can be requisite to the restoration of all the powers of the man, but the restoration of the body, (no particle of which can be lost) to a state of *life*.”

Of the Origin of the popular Opinions concerning the Soul, our author gives the following account.

“The notion of the soul of man being a substance distinct from the body, has been shown, and I hope to satisfaction, not to have been known to the writers of the scriptures, and especially those of the Old Testament. According to the uniform system of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and I may say an opposite

foundation, viz. that of the *resurrection* of something belonging to us that *dies*, and is buried, that is the *body* which is always considered as *the man*. This doctrine is manifestly superfluous on the idea of the soul being a substance so distinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to subsist, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion, therefore, not having been known to the *Jews*, and being repugnant to the scheme of *revelation*, must have had its source in *heathenism*; but with respect to the *date* of its appearance, and the *manner of its introduction*, there is room for conjecture and speculation.

"As far as we are able to collect any thing concerning the history of this opinion, it is evidently not the growth of Greece or Rome, but was received by the philosophers of those countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the East. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pausanias gives it to the Chaldeans, or the Indians. I own, however (though every thing relating to so very obscure a subject must be in a great measure conjectural), that I am inclined to ascribe it to the Egyptians; thinking, with Mr. Toland, that it might possibly have been suggested by some of their known customs respecting the dead, whom they preserved with great care, and disposed of with a solemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have arisen among them from other causes, without the help of those peculiar customs.

"The authority of Herodotus, the oldest Greek historian, and who had himself travelled into Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says (Ed. Steph. p. 137.), that "the Egyptians were the first who maintained that the soul of man is immortal, that when the body dies it enters into that of some other animal, and when it has transmigrated through all terrestrial, marine and flying animals, it returns to the body of a man again. This revolution is completed in three thousand years." He adds, that "several Greeks, whose names he would not mention, had published that doctrine as their own."

"Mr. Toland's hypothesis is as follows, and I think I should do wrong to omit the mention of it. My reader may judge of the probability of it for himself. "The funeral rites of the Egyptians," he says (*Letters to Serena*, p. 45.), "and their historical method of preserving the memory of deserving persons, seems to have been the occasion of this belief. Their way of burying was by embalming the dead bodies, which they deposited in a subterranean grotto, where they continued intire for thousands of years; so that before any notion of separate or immortal souls, the common language was that such a one was under ground, that he was carried over the river *Acherusia* by *Charon* (the title of the public ferryman for that purpose), and laid happily to rest in the *Elysian fields*, which was the common burying-place near Memphis."

"This hypothesis is rendered more probable by an observation of Cicero's. He says (*Tusculan Questions*, Ed. Glasg. p. 37.) "the body dies falling to the ground, and being buried there, it was imagined that the deceased passed the rest of their life under ground." Among other absurdities flowing from this notion, he says that, though the
bodies

bodies were buried, they still imagined them to be *apud inferos*; and whereas they could not conceive the mind to exist of itself, they gave it a form or figure."

On this account the Dr. thus remarks.

"I think, however, that the notion of there being something in man distinct from his body, and the cause of his feeling, thinking, willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in those rude ages without such a step as this; though no doubt the custom above mentioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to observe how very ready all illiterate persons are to ascribe the cause of any difficult appearance to an *invisible agent*, distinct from the subject on which the operation is exerted. This led the Jews (after the heathens) to the idea of madmen being possessed of *dæmons*, and it is peculiarly remarkable how very ready mankind have always been to ascribe the unknown cause of extraordinary appearances to something to which they can give the name of *spirit*, after this term had been once applied in a similar manner. Thus that which struck an animal dead over fermenting liquor was first called the *gas*, or *spirit of the liquor*, while the fermented liquor itself also, being possessed of very active powers, was thought to contain *another kind of spirit*; and many times do we hear ignorant persons, on seeing a remarkable experiment in philosophy, especially if *air*, or any *invisible fluid*, be concerned in it, perfectly satisfied with saying that is the *spirit of it*. Now, though the idea of a spirit, as a distinct substance from the body, did not perhaps immediately occur in all these cases, their conceptions might afford a foundation for such an hypothesis.

"It would be most natural, however, at first, to ascribe the cause of thought to something that made a *visible* difference, between a living and a dead man; and *breathing* being the most obvious difference of this kind, those powers would be ascribed to his *breath*: and accordingly we find, that in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin languages, the name of the *soul* is the same with that of *breath*. From whence we may safely infer, that originally it was considered as nothing else, and hence the custom of receiving the *parting breath* of dying persons, as if to catch their departing souls. And though, to appearance, the breath of a man mixes with the rest of the air, yet, the nature of air being very little known, it was not at all extraordinary, that it should have been considered as not *really* mixing with the atmosphere, but as ascending by its levity to the higher regions above the clouds. And men having got this idea, the notion of its having *come down from above the clouds*, where God was supposed to reside, would naturally enough follow.

"But living bodies differ from dead ones by their *warmth* as well as by the circumstance of breathing. Hence might come the idea of the principle of life and thought being a kind of *vital fire*; and as flame always ascends, men would, of course, imagine that the soul of man, when set loose from the body, would ascend to the *region of fire*, which was supposed to be above the atmosphere. From these leading ideas it could not be difficult for the imagination of speculative men to make out a complete system of *pre-existence* and *transmigration*; and there

there being so much of *fancy* in it, it is still less to be wondered at, that it should have been diversified so much as we find it to have been in different countries, and different schools of philosophy.

"Diseases and other evils having their seat in the *body*, the *matter* of which it is composed might easily be conceived to be the source of those and all other evils; a disordered mind being, in many cases, the evident effect of a disordered body; and they who were disposed to believe in a benevolent deity, would by this means easily make out to themselves a reason for the *origin of evil*, without reflecting any blame upon God on that account. They would ascribe it to the *untraffable nature of matter*.

"Lastly, what could be more natural to account for the ethereal soul being confined to such a body or clog, as the supposition of its being a punishment for offences committed in a pre-existent state?

"But the notion of a proper *immaterial being*, without all *extension*, or *relation to place*, did not appear till of late years in comparison; what the ancients meant by an immaterial substance being nothing more than an *attenuated matter*, like *air, ether, fire, or light*, considered as fluids, beyond which their idea of *incorporeity* did not go. Plessus says, that the antient Heathens, both Greeks and other, called only the grosser bodies, *τα παχύληρα των σωματων* corporeal. *Le Clerc's Index Philologicus, MATERIA.*

"Indeed, the vulgar notion of a *soul*, or *spirit*, wherever it has been found to exist, has been the same in all ages; and in this respect even the learned of antient times are only to be considered as the vulgar. We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghost bore the shape of, and exactly resembled, the deceased person to whom it had belonged, that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried, at which time it was admitted to the shades below. In both these states it was possessed of the *intire* consciousness, and retained the friendships and enmities of the man. But in the case of deified persons, it was supposed that, besides this ghost, there was something more ethereal or divine belonging to them, like *another better self*, that ascended to the upper regions, and was associated with the immortal gods."

In giving a brief History of Opinions concerning the State of the Dead, our author observes that,

"Though this doctrine of the immortality of the soul, as a substance distinct from the body, is manifestly favourable to popery, but few of the Protestants appear to have had strength of mind to call it in question. Luther, however, did it, though the opposition almost died with him. In the defence of his propositions (in 1520) which had been condemned by a bull of Leo X. he ranks the opinions of the *natural immortality of the soul*, and that of the soul being *the substantial form of the body*, among the monstrous opinions to be found in the *Roman dungbills of decretals*; and he afterwards made use of the doctrine of the *sleep of the soul*, as a confutation of purgatory and saint worship, and he continued in that belief to the last moment of his life. *Historical View*, p. 15. William Tyndale also, the famous translator of the Bible into English, in defending Luther's doctrine against Sir Thomas

More's objections, conſiders the ſleep of the ſoul as the doctrine of the Proteſtants in his time, and founded on the ſcriptures. ib. p. 16.

" Calvin, however, violently oppoſed this doctrine; and this ſeems to have given a different turn to the ſentiments of the reformed in general, and Tyndale himſelf recanted his opinion. Calvin ſeems to have been embarraſſed with the ſouls of the wicked. He ſays it is nothing to him what becomes of their ſouls, that he would only be reſponſible for the faithful. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 25. But it appears from Calvin's own writings, that *thouſands* of the reformers were of a different opinion from him; and though the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul be exhibited in all the preſent proteſtant confeſſions of faith, there is little or nothing of it in the earlieſt of them.

" After the long prevalence of the doctrine of the *intermediate ſtate*, that of the *ſleep of the ſoul* has of late years been revived, and gains ground, not ſo much from conſiderations of philoſophy, as from a cloſer attention to the ſenſe of the ſcriptures. No perſon has done more in this way than the preſent excellent biſhop of Carlisle. Very important ſervice has alſo been done to the ſame cauſe by the author of the *Hiſtorical View of this controverſy*, from which much of this ſection is extracted. Upon the whole, the doctrine of an intermediate ſtate is now retained by few who have the character of thinking with freedom and liberality in other reſpects. And the more attention is given to the ſubject in a philoſophical light, the better founded, I doubt not, will the concluſions that have been drawn from the ſtudy of the ſcriptures appear to be.

" It has not, however, been conſidered how much the doctrine of the *inſenſible ſtate of the ſoul* in death affects the doctrine of the *ſeparate exiſtence of the ſoul*, which it appears to me to do very materially. It certainly takes away all the *uſe* of the doctrine, and therefore ſhould leave us more at liberty from any prejudice in the diſcuſſion of the queſtion, ſince nothing is really gained by its being decided either way. Though we ſhould have a ſoul, yet while it is in a ſtate of *utter inſenſibility*, it is, in fact, as much *dead*, as the body itſelf while it continues in a ſtate of death. Our calling it a ſtate of *ſleep*, is only giving another and ſofter term to the ſame thing; for our *ideas* of the ſtate itſelf are preciſely the ſame, by whatever name we pleaſe to call it. I flatter myſelf, however, that in time chriſtians will get over this, as well as other prejudices; and, thinking with more reſpect of *matter*, as the creation of God, may think it capable of being endued with all the powers of which we are conſcious, without having recourſe to a principle, which, in the moſt favourable view of the ſubject, accords but ill with what matter has been conceived to be."

Our author's laſt ſection contains an Account of Opinions, concerning the Sentient Principle in Brutes.

" The ſouls of brutes," ſays he, " which have ſo very much embarraſſed the modern ſyſtems, occaſioned no difficulty whatever in that of the ancients. They conſidered all ſouls as originally the ſame, in whatever bodies they might happen to be confined. To-day it might be that of a man, to-morrow that of a horſe, then that of a man again, and laſtly be abſorbed into the univerſal ſoul, from which it proceeded.

" But

" But christianity made a great difference between men and brutes. To the former a happy immortality was promised, and in such a manner as made it impossible to think that brutes could have any title to it. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, to make a change in the former uniform and comprehensive system; and though some philosophical christians still retained the doctrine of transmigration, it was generally given up, notwithstanding the doctrines of *pre existence*, and of a *separate consciousness after death*, which were originally parts of the same system, continued.

" To account for the great difference which christianity made between the future state of men and brutes, and yet retain the separate state of the soul, it was necessary to find some *specific difference* between them. But a most unhappy one was pitched upon, one that is contradicted by every appearance. It has, however, been so necessary to the rest of the now *disjointed system*, that notwithstanding this circumstance, it has maintained its ground, in some sort, to this day. It is that, though the soul of a man is immortal, that of a brute is not; and yet it is evident that brutes have the rudiments of all our faculties, without exception; so that they differ from us in *degree* only, and not in *kind*. But the consequence of supposing the soul of a man and that of a brute to be of the same nature, was absolutely inadmissible; for they must then, it was thought, have been provided for in a future state as well as our own.

" It has been seen that the Platonists thought there was something corporeal even in the human soul. It is no wonder then that the souls of brutes should have been thought to be *wholly* so, and therefore mortal, which was the opinion, I believe, of all the christian world till very lately. Even the great Lord Bacon entertained this opinion. *Anima sensibilis*, says he, *esse brutorum, plane substantia corpore aconfundenda*. Gale, p 326. The celebrated anatomist Willis also professed the same. *ib*.

" The opinion of Descartes was much more extraordinary, for he made the souls of brutes to be mere *automata*, and his disciples in general denied that they had any perception. Malebranche says that they eat without pleasure, and cry without pain, that they fear nothing, know nothing; and if they act in such a manner as shews understanding, it is because God, having made them to preserve them, has formed their bodies so as mechanically to avoid whatever might hurt them.

" The learned Dr. Gale maintains at large that the sensitive soul is corporeal, *Philosophia Generalis*, p. 323. and the very justly celebrated Dr. Cudworth has revived, for the sake of helping this great difficulty, the long-exploded notion of the *soul of the world*, from which the souls of brutes issue, and to which he supposes they return, without retaining their separate consciousness after death. " They may, if they please," says he, p. 45. " suppose the souls of brutes, being but to many particular *irradiations*, or *effluxes*, from that *life above*, whenever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and perception of themselves in it, so long as it continues such. But so soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their in-

“ disposition, become incapable of being farther acted upon by them, then to be resumed again, and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself, by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.”

“ This writer, however, suggests another method of solving this difficulty, much more liberal and rational; supposing the immortality of the soul not to follow necessarily from its immateriality, but from the appointment of God. But he injures the brutes very much when, to account for the difference in the divine dispensations to them and us, he supposes them to be destitute of *morality and liberty*, p. 45.

“ I am most surprised to find Mr. Locke among those who maintain, that, though the souls of men are, in part, at least, immaterial, those of brutes, which resemble men so much, are wholly material. It is evident, however, from the manner in which he expresses himself on the subject, not only that this was his own opinion, but that it was the general opinion of his time. He says (*Essay*, vol. I. p. 148.)

“ Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, yet I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from thinking; —and to say that flies and mites have immortal souls will probably be looked on as going a great way to serve an hypothesis. Many, however, have been compelled by the analogy between men and brutes to go thus far. I do not see how they can stop short of it.”

“ It would be endless to recite all the hypotheses that have been framed to explain the difference between brutes and men, with respect to their intellects here, and their fate hereafter. I shall, however, mention that of Mr. Locke, who says, “ This, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of *abstraction* is not at all in them, and that the having of *general ideas* is that which puts a perfect distinction between men and brutes. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas, from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any general signs.” *Essay*, vol. I. p. 120.

“ In fact, however, as brutes have the same external senses that we have, they have, of course, all the same *inlets to ideas* that we have; and though, on account of their wanting a sufficient *quantity of brain*, perhaps, chiefly, the combination and association of their ideas cannot be so complex as ours, and therefore they cannot make so great a progress in intellectual improvements, they must necessarily have, *in kind*, every faculty that we are possessed of. Also, since they evidently have *memory, passions, will, and judgement* too, as their actions demonstrate, they must, of course, have the faculty that we call *abstraction* as well as the rest; though, not having the use of *words*, they cannot communicate their ideas to us. They must, at least, have a natural capacity for what is called *abstraction*, it being nothing more than a particular case of the *association of ideas*, of which, in general, they are certainly possessed as well as ourselves.

“ Besides, if dogs had no general or abstract ideas, but only such as were appropriated to particular *individual objects*, they could never be taught

taught to distinguish a *man*, as such, a *hare*, as such, or a *partridge*, as such, &c. But their actions shew that they may be trained to catch hares, set partridges, or *birds* in general, and even attack *men*, as well as to distinguish their own master, and the servants of the family in which they live.

“Whether brutes will survive the grave we cannot tell. This depends upon other considerations than their being capable of reason and reflection. If the resurrection be properly *miraculous*, and entirely out of all the established laws of nature, it will appear probable that brutes have no share in it; since we know of no declaration that God has made to that purpose, and they can have no expectation of any such thing. But if the resurrection be, in fact, *within the proper course of nature*, extensively considered, and consequently there be something remaining of every organized body that death does not destroy, there will be reason to conclude that they will be benefited by it as well as ourselves. And the great misery to which some of them are exposed in this life, may incline us to think, that a merciful and just God will make them some recompence for it hereafter. He is *their* Maker and Father as well as *ours*. But with respect to this question, we have no sufficient *data* from which to argue, and therefore must acquiesce in our utter ignorance; satisfied that the Maker and Judge of all will do what is right.”

Firmly acquiescing in this concluding reflection; although by no means convinced that the sufferings of brutes are not compensated in this life; we take our leave, for the present, of this very ingenious and interesting publication.

W.

An Essay on the Legality of Pressing Seamen. 8vo. 2s. Cadell.

It is a maxim in politics that private interest, particular in cases of eminent danger, should ever be sacrificed to the public good. On this principle the expediency of pressing seamen in time of war, when they enhance the price of their labour or abscond from service, will hardly be disputed. At least no objection can be made to such expedient till a better be discovered. The *legality* of the practice is another point, and this it is, which is here discussed; in the following order. Premising the state of the question and confining the point to the impress of seamen only, the writer lays down the method, in which he proceeds in its investigation.

“Though I entirely agree with those who think slightly of the use of metaphysical inquiries on the nature and first principles of government; yet, on the present occasion, we cannot, by any proper means, entirely discard them. The objection most obvious to the minds of the generality of mankind, and most frequently used in conversation, is the extreme hardship which the measure in dispute brings on one particular

Let of men, exclusive of the other ranks of life. This inequality of condition appears, to many, so convincing an argument of the iniquity of the measure, which, they suppose, produces it, as to be, of itself, sufficient to preclude all farther reasoning. The fact, say they, is certain. You cannot deny that the impress necessarily involves one part of the state in a scene of extreme calamity and distress. While you and the greater part of the nation are allowed to pursue the ordinary occupations and amusements of life, a very numerous, and perhaps the most valuable part of the community, is exposed to be torn from their families and friends, and irretrievably fixed in a state of continual hardship and danger.

To meet this objection fully, it seemed necessary to resort to the origin, and to expose the causes, of the inequality complained of. We shall attempt to shew, that an inequality of rank is inseparable from society; that, in the distribution of the duties of society; those which are the offensive and disagreeable public duties, (among which we reckon personal service in the armies and navies of the state,) must fall to the lot of that part of mankind which fills the lower ranks of life; that this mode of distribution, howsoever hard or unjust it may appear to the human eye, is necessarily incident to society in all its states; and that it is, in some degree, corrected by government, though a necessary attendant on all governments.

“ In the subsequent section, the third of this little work, I shall attempt to shew, that the impress of seamen is a measure of necessity and expediency, justifiable on both, and on either, of these principles; and that, in the advanced state of government, which the British nation has reached, personal service neither is, nor ought to be, nor can be, the duty of every citizen. I shall attempt to prove this by general reasoning, and to illustrate it by examples.

“ In the fourth section, I shew, by the examples of some of the principal states mentioned in history, whose constitution approaches nearest to ours, that an impress is both expedient and necessary, to fill the armies and navies of our state.

“ In the fifth and last section, I shall attempt to prove, that an impress of seamen is a part of the common law, and often recognised in the statute law of this realm.”

Our author, indeed, varies a little from the plan here laid down; dividing his essay into six sections: the *first* entitled introduction; the *second* exhibiting the state of the question; the *third* an argument to prove that, “ it is a right inherent in government of every civil society, to employ particular members of it in every service, however hard or dangerous, which the public utility of the society requires;” the *fourth* maintains, that “ it is necessary and expedient to the British government to impress seamen for the public service;” the *fifth*, “ that the impressing men for the public service is a measure of necessity and expedience, and that the duty of personal service must fall on the lower rank of men, as soon as a nation becomes wealthy, and attends to commerce, shewn by the examples of some free states

states ancient and modern :” the *sixth* and last, “that the right of government to impress seamen for the public service, is not against the constitution of this realm ; and that it always made a part of our common law, and is repeatedly recognized by our statute-law.”

We shall select from this last section a specimen of this very discerning and judicious writer’s mode and substance of argument.

“The Reader may observe, that I assert the practice of impressing to be both legal and constitutional. By legal I mean, that it is congenial with the spirit of the constitution. I apprehend it is possible to be the one, without being the other. The legislative power may chance to pass a law, which experience may afterwards shew to have been repugnant to the genius of the constitution. So the genius of the constitution may require some additional institution to be passed into law, or some established institution to be abrogated, without attracting the attention or assistance of the legislature. I wish to impress the reader with this observation, because I think much of the perplexity which is generally found in the discussion of political questions might be avoided by attending to it. Thus, when we shall endeavour to prove that it is legal, it will be by no means a proper answer to assert, that it is unconstitutional. In the same manner, I think it no answer to the assertion of it’s being unconstitutional, to produce one positive law in it’s behalf.—They are therefore separate articles : but the examining either of them reflects light upon the other.

“I shall begin by proving the practice in question to be constitutional.

“Pressing, or, in other words, obliging persons to serve the public contrary to their will, appears throughout our constitution in a variety of forms. It is impossible to point the time when it did not exist. It is the nature of all government, that some of its offices should be the objects of the ambition, others the objects of the dislike, of the individuals governed. To some of them is annexed whatever attracts the wishes of the human heart ; to others, expence, labour, and danger, are inseparably joined. The latter are not less necessary to the existence of government than the former. But as individuals seldom possess the ethereal spirit of patriotism in a sufficient degree to make them seek by their own choice the latter objects, it is absolutely necessary that government should have recourse to compulsory methods. What was originally the election of members to serve in parliament, but impressing such persons as were deemed qualified by fortune and abilities to perform the public business ? For doing this duty, they received a stated stipend ; against it, they had no negative. Where would our constitution have been if, in those days, the language which now is used by the adversaries of the press, had been used by the wealthy commoners, and met with its desired effect ? What is at present the obligation to serve the office of a sheriff, but being pressed to a service of fatigue, expence, and even of danger ? To persons of inferior rank,
are

are not the serving the office of a juryman, a church-warden, a constable, or any other parish-office, all different species of pressing, all of inconvenience, some of danger, to the parties? Yet society could not exist without such service. And has not the sheriff a right, on certain occasions, to raise the *posse comitatus*? and what is this right, but a right to press every male in his country above fifteen years of age (peers excepted), who are obliged to attend under pain of fine and imprisonment? And has not the Militia Act made every man liable to serve as a soldier, and, at times, subject to the articles of war?"

Having shewn that compulsion to public service is perfectly congenial to the spirit of the English constitution, and that it does not fall so hard upon the seaman, as the compulsion to some other duties; our author proceeds to shew that it has been for time immemorial in use in England, and has constantly made a part of the Common-law.—On this head he pertinently remarks, that

"Persons unacquainted with the constitution of this kingdom, are apt to suppose that no establishment can have the force of law, unless it had been formerly, and in direct terms, passed into a law by the legislature. It is necessary to acquaint such persons, that the greater part, by far, of the laws of this kingdom lies in custom, and that no proof, but immemorial usage, can be given of their being laws. To instance one of the many striking examples of those laws, the course in which lands descend by inheritance is governed entirely by laws of this nature, and is not settled by any positive law, discoverable at this day. At first, it was not practised as it now is; but having been in some measure practised on a particular emergency, and found a salutary measure, it was repeated. This repetition produced another, perhaps with some amendments. In this course it proceeds till its origin is forgot. This is, generally speaking, the process of the greater part of the laws of every country; for, in all countries, besides the body of written, or as we call it Statute law, there is a collection of unwritten usages, of equal force with these written laws, and which answer to what we call the common law. But the legality of impressing of seamen has the addition of one very strong circumstance of proof, which is wanting to many other parts of the common law; that it is very early taken notice of, and, in some measure, modelled by the acts of the legislature."

Our author proceeds, in proof of the above positions, to give the following short summary of the naval history of the Saxons.

"Alfred, the father of our shipping, manned his fleet at first with seamen who had served with the Franciscan Pyrates. The arts of navigation improved considerably, and long voyages were attempted frequently both in his and his successors reigns. In the reign of King Athelstan, a law passed, that every merchant, who had made three long voyages by sea, should be admitted to the rank of a thane. The writers of those times describe the magnificence of King Edgar's fleet in terms to which posterity has refused belief. King Ethelred, on a sudden

sudden invasion of the Danes, ordered every person possessed of 310 hides of land to furnish a ship for the defence of the state. And a tax of a shilling was imposed on every acre in the kingdom. This tax is known in history by the name of Danegelt. The money arising therefrom was employed sometimes in raising forces against, and sometimes in purchasing peace from, the Danes. Perhaps Mr. Selden was right in supposing that some part of this tax was expended annually on a fleet purposely equipped to resist the invasions of that formidable enemy. Other taxes were raised for the same purpose. The right of personal service included generally personal attendance in all naval expeditions. The sovereigns of the islands circumjacent bound themselves, by their oath, to King Edgar, to do him service both by sea and land. From the accounts of those times it appears, that some lands were particularly held by a kind of sea-service. In the book of Domesday mention is made of places bound to find the King with seamen, with iron for his ships, with horses to carry the armour of the soldiery to their ships, and with provisions, money, and armour, fit for the use of the fleet."

The history of the British navy, with the laws occasionally made concerning it, are next particularly traced through the reigns of King John; Henry III. Edward I. II. and III. Richard II. Henry IV. progressively and downward to the reign of Queen Anne. At the close of which series of proof, this accurately-distinguishing writer makes the following ingenious remark on the meaning of the words, made use of in the ancient writs occasionally cited.

"In the citations contained in this section, from the records of the kingdom, frequent use is made of the words *taking up*, *appointing*, and *arresting*.—The original words are, *capienti*, *eligendi*, *arrestandi*, in Latin;—*prendre*, *élire*, *arrêter*, in French.—Besides the obvious meaning of these words, and the import of their ordinary use, they have a peculiar meaning, when taken in a legal sense. In that sense they always carry with them an idea of coercion.—It is necessary to mention this, as it is pretended that, by the writs in question, nothing more was intended than leave to persons to retain, or as we should call it, *to insist*, soldiers. This must appear, on reflection, very far from their meaning. In the more early times, the word used to summons a person to appear at trial was *capio*. There are no writs more frequently mentioned in the ancient law-books than the *capere magnum* and *capere parvum*. If the person who was summoned by these writs did not appear at the time appointed, he lost his lands concerning which the plea was. The same inference lies from the writ *capias ut legatum*, and from every other writ where the word *capio* is used.

Eligere, in its most obvious meaning, implies constraint on the person chosen. But, as most of the offices filled by election, and particularly that of a seat in parliament, are objects of ambition, we rather consider the election to them as a favour conferred, than as an obligation imposed. A moment's consideration of the many offices now filled by election, where election is synonymous with compulsion,

and on the striking revolutions in the sentiments of mankind in respect of others, which, though now objects of the most important pursuits, were once objects of dislike, and, till even a late period, of the greatest indifference, will convince the reader that the meaning of the word *eligendi* includes, besides the power of chusing, the power of compelling the persons chosen to obey. On the authority of a manuscript of Judge Yelverton, I have translated it by the word *appoint*.

Arrestare naturally implies *compulsion*. In its legal import it often implies detaining persons, or things, for the King's service. In the ancient records of this kingdom, and in the civil law, from which many of our records are borrowed, it signifies detaining persons or goods in the hands of the King, or in his courts, till something that regards them, and then in dispute, be decided."

After replying to another immaterial objection, the writer concludes with the following quotation, on this interesting subject, from the late Mr. Hume; which, as he justly observes, bears the strongest marks of that penetration and depth of thought, for which that writer has been so highly celebrated.

"It is a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undisputed and universal, that a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magistrate, is not so dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconsiderable, which he acquires from violence and usurpation. For, besides that the law always limits every power which it bestows, the very receiving it as a concession establishes the authority whence it is derived, and preserves the harmony of the constitution. By the same right that one prerogative is assumed without law, another may also be claimed, and another, with still greater facility; while the first usurpations both serve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroism of Hampden's conduct, who subitained the whole violence of royal prosecution, rather than pay a tax of twenty shillings, not imposed by parliament; hence the care of all English patriots to guard against the first encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the existence, at this day, of English liberty.

"There is, however, one occasion, where the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *pressing of seamen*. The exercise of an irregular power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and though it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper restrictions to the sovereign, no safe expedient could ever be proposed for that purpose; and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from usurpation. While this power is exercised to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly submit to it, from a sense of its use and necessity; and the sailors, who are alone affected by it, find nobody to support them, in claiming the rights and privileges, which the law grants, without distinction, to all English subjects. But were this power, on any occasion, made an instrument of faction, or ministerial tyranny, the opposite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and support the injured party; the liberty of Englishmen would be asserted; juries would be implacable;

cable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both against law and equity, would meet with the severest vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant such an authority, they would probably fall into one of these two inconveniencies: They would either bestow it under so many restrictions as would make it lose its effect, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would render it so large and comprehensive, as might give occasion to great abuses, for which we could, in that case, have no remedy. The very irregularity of the practice, at present, prevents its abuse, by affording so easy a remedy against them.

"I pretend not, by this reasoning, to exclude all possibility of contriving a register for seamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty, I only observe, that no satisfactory scheme of that nature has ever been proposed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice seemingly the most absurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed against law. A continued violence is permitted in the crown, amidst the greatest jealousy and watchfulness in the people; nay proceeding from these very principles: Liberty, in a country of the highest liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild state of nature is renewed, in one of the most civilized societies of mankind: and great violence and disorder are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the supreme magistrate, the other the sanction of fundamental laws."

A Treatise on Man, his intellectual Faculties, and his Education. Translated from the French, with Additional Notes, by W. Hooper, M. D. 2 vol. 8vo. 12s. Law.

(Continued from Page 343, vol. VI. and concluded.)

From our former strictures on this work, our readers will see that we do not altogether agree, in thinking the author's philosophy of the mind exactly deduced from nature, or that even the analogy of his principles to those of Mr. Locke, of which he boasts, is a proof of it.

The influence of education we admit, as well as the force of many of his objections to the inconsistent system of Rousseau; but we can no more admit that education entirely forms the character than that corporeal sensibility constitutes the whole man. If the actual faculty of thinking depends, as we presume, on the system of the percipient organs, the greater or less perfection of that system must affect the genius and character of the man: nay, so various may those systems be, that it may be as difficult to find two men exactly of the same temper and talents, as it is to meet with two men of exactly the

same features. Education and habit have, we know, a certain effect on the countenance; but we should as soon conclude that the same education would make men look alike, as that it would make them think alike. By thinking alike, however, we would be understood to mean, not merely being of the same habitual opinions; or, as it is termed, of the *same mind*. In this, education and custom is an almost universal law-giver: but by thinking alike we mean to give them the same powers of imagination, conception, and retention. Without this equality of mental capacity, men cannot properly be said to think alike, however similar their notions. To be of the *same mind*, and to possess the same characteristic *genius*, or *understanding*, are, in our opinion, circumstances very different; notwithstanding Helvetius would persuade us Mr. Locke hath confounded them.

To dismiss, however, the metaphysics of this treatise, we shall take leave of it, with the author's application of his philosophy to politics.—In his 8th section he treats on that important subject the happiness of individuals, and that on which it immediately depends in a state of society, the basis of national felicity, composed of it. In answer to the question, "whether men in the state of society, can be all equally happy?" he says,

"There is no society in which all the members can be equally rich and powerful. Is there any in which they can be equally happy? It is that we are to examine.

Sagacious laws may without doubt produce the prodigy of universal felicity. When every citizen has some property, is in a certain degree of ease, and can, by seven or eight hours labour, abundantly supply his own wants, and those of his family; they are then all as happy as they can be.

To prove this truth, let us consider in what the happiness of an individual consists. This preliminary knowledge is the sole basis on which we can establish the national felicity.

"A nation is the assemblage of all the inhabitants of a country, and the public happiness is composed of that of all the individuals. Now, what is it constitutes the happiness of an individual? Perhaps it is still unknown, and men have not sufficiently employed themselves in the examination of a question, which however may throw the greatest lights on the several parts of administration.

"If we ask the majority of mankind, they will say, that to be equally happy, all should be equally rich and powerful. Nothing more false than this assertion. In fact, if life be nothing more than an aggregate of an infinity of separate instants, all men would be equally happy, if they could all fill up those instants in a manner equally agreeable. Is that to be done in different situations? Is it possible to colour all the moments of human life with the same tint of felicity?

felicity? To resolve this question, let us see in what different occupations the several parts of the day are necessarily consumed.

"Men hunger and thirst; they require to lie with their wives, to sleep, &c. Of the twenty-four hours of the day, they employ ten or twelve in providing for these several wants. As soon as they are gratified, from the dealer in rabbits skins, to the monarch, all are equally happy.

"It is in vain to say that the table of wealth is more delicate than that of mediocrity. When the labourer is well fed, he is content. The different cookery of different people proves, as I have already said, that good cheer is that to which we have been accustomed.

"There are then ten or twelve hours in the day, in which all men, able to procure the necessaries of life, may be equally happy. With regard to the ten or twelve remaining hours, that is to say, those that separate a rising want from one that is gratified, who can doubt that men do not then enjoy the same felicity, if they commonly make the same use of them, and if all devote them to labour, that is, in the acquisition of money sufficient to supply their wants? Now, the postillion who rides, the carter who drives, and the clerk who engrosses, all in their several ranks propose the same end; they must therefore, in this sense, employ their time in the same manner.

"But, it will be said, is it the same with the opulent idler? His riches furnish him, without labour, with all he wants. I allow it. But is he therefore more happy? No. Nature does not multiply in his favour the wants of hunger, love, &c. But does not the opulent man fill up in a manner more agreeable the interval that separates a gratified want from one that is rising? I doubt it.

"The artisan is doubtless subject to labour, and so is the idle opulent to discontent: and which of these two evils is the greatest?

"If labour be generally regarded as an evil, it is because in most governments the necessaries of life are not to be had without excessive labour; from whence the very idea of labour constantly excites that of pain.

"Labour, however, is not pain in itself. Habit renders it easy; and when it is pursued without remarkable fatigue, is in itself an advantage. How many artisans are there who when rich still continue their occupations, and quit them not without regret, when age obliges them to it? There is nothing that habit does not render agreeable.

"In the exercise of their employments, their professions, their talents, the magistrate who judges, the smith who forges, and the messenger who runs, the poet and musician who compose, all taste nearly the same pleasure, and in their several occupations equally find means to avoid that natural evil, discontent.

The busy man is the happy man. To prove this, I distinguish two sorts of pleasures. The one are the pleasures of the senses. These are founded on corporeal wants, are enjoyed by all conditions of men, and at the time of enjoyment all are equally happy. But these pleasures are of short duration.

"The others are the pleasures of expectation. Among these I reckon all the means of procuring corporeal pleasures; these means are by expectation

expectation always converted into real pleasures. When a joiner takes up his plane, what does he experience? All the pleasures of expectation annexed to the payment for his work. Now these pleasures are not experienced by the opulent man, who finds in his money, without labour, an exchange for all the objects of his desires. He has nothing to do to procure them, and is so much the more subject to discontent. He is therefore always uneasy, always in motion, continually rolling about in his carriage, like the squirrel in his cage, to get rid of his disgust.

"To be happy, the idle opulent is forced to wait, till nature excites in him some fresh desire. It is therefore the disgust of idleness, that in him fills up the interval between a gratified and a rising want. But in the artisan it is labour, which, affording him the means of providing for his wants and his amusements, becomes thereby agreeable.

"The wealthy idler experiences a thousand instances of discontent, while the labouring man enjoys the continual pleasure of fresh expectations.

"Labour, when it is moderate, is in general the most happy method of employing our time, when we have no want to gratify, and do not enjoy any of the pleasures of the senses, of all others doubtless the most poignant, and least durable.

"How many agreeable sensations are unknown to him whom no want obliges to think! Do my immense riches secure me all the pleasures that the poor desire but cannot obtain without much labour? I give myself up to indolence. I wait, as I just now said, with impatience, till nature shall awake in me some new desire; and while I wait, am discontented and unhappy. It is not so with the man of business. When the idea of labour, and of the money with which it is required, are associated in the memory with the idea of happiness, the labour itself becomes a pleasure. Each stroke of the axe brings to the workman's mind the pleasure that the money he is to receive for his day's labour will procure him.

"In general, every useful occupation fills up, in the most agreeable manner, the interval that separates a gratified from a rising want; that is, the ten or twelve hours of the day, when we most envy the indolence of the rich, and think they enjoy superior happiness.

"The pleasure with which the carter puts his team to the cart, and the tradesman opens his chest and his journal, is a proof of this truth.

"Employment gives pleasure to every moment, but is unknown to the great and idle opulent. The measure of our wealth, whatever prejudice may think, is not therefore the measure of our happiness. Consequently, in every condition, where, as I have said, a man can, by moderate labour, provide for all his wants, is above indigence, and not exposed to the discontent of the idly rich, he is nearly as happy as he can be.

"Men, therefore, without being equal in riches and power, may be equal in happiness."

Having dispatched this part of the argument, our author proceeds to consider the causes of the unhappiness of almost all nations;

nations; which he imputes to the imperfection of their laws, and the too unequal partition of their riches.

"There are in most kingdoms only two classes of citizens, one of which want necessities, and the other riot in superfluities.

"The former cannot gratify their wants but by an excessive labour: such labour is a natural evil for all; and to some it is a punishment.

"The second class live in abundance, but at the same time in the anguish of discontent. Now, discontent is an evil almost as much to be dreaded as indigence.

"Most nations, therefore, must be peopled by the unfortunate. What should be done to make them happy? Diminish the riches of some; augment that of others; put the poor in such a state of ease, that they may by seven or eight hours labour abundantly provide for the wants of themselves and their families. It is then, that a people will become as happy as they can be.

"They then enjoy, with regard to corporeal pleasures, all that the rich enjoy. The appetite of the poor is by nature the same as that of the rich; and to use a trite proverb, *The rich cannot dine twice*. I know there are costly pleasures out of the reach of mere competency. But these may be always replaced by others; and the time between gratifying one want and the rising of another, that is between one repast and another, or one enjoyment and another, may be filled up in a manner equally agreeable. In every wise government men may enjoy an equal felicity, as well in the moments when they gratify their wants, as in those that separate one want from another. Now if life be nothing more than an aggregate of two sorts of periods, the man at his ease, as I proposed to prove, may then equal in happiness the most rich and most powerful.

"But is it possible, continues M. Helvetius, for good laws to put all the people in the state of ease requisite for the acquiring of happiness? It is to that fact this important question is now reduced."

A question which he answers in the affirmative, by declaring, "that it is possible to set the people more at their ease."

"In the present state of most nations, says he, if government, struck with the too great disproportions in the fortune of the people, were desirous of making them more equal, it would doubtless have a thousand obstacles to surmount. Such a project, sagaciously conceived, could not, and ought not to be executed, but by continual and insensible alterations; these alterations however are possible.

"If the laws should assign some property to every individual, they would snatch the poor from the horror of indigence, and the rich from the misery of discontent; and render them both more happy.

"But supposing these laws to be established, would men, without being equally rich and powerful, think themselves equally happy? There is nothing more difficult to persuade them on the present plan of education. Why? Because from their infancy they have been accustomed to associate in their minds the idea of riches with that of happiness; and in almost all countries that notion is engraved the deeper in

in their memories, as they cannot obtain sufficient to supply their pressing and daily wants, without excessive labour.

“Would it be so in countries governed by sagacious laws?”

“If the savage regards gold and dignities with the highest contempt, the idea of extreme wealth cannot be necessarily connected with that of extreme happiness. We may therefore form distinct and different ideas of them, and prove to mankind, that in the series of instants which compose their lives, all may be equally happy; if by the form of government to a state of ease, they can join the security of their property, lives and liberty.”

After treating a number of interesting and entertaining subjects, in rather a loose and unconnected manner, our author ascribes every thing, that tends to the happiness of nations, to legislation. As he ascribes the physical character of man to a physical education, so he does their moral character to a moral education. To improve them in this particular, he gives us a sketch of a moral catechism; with an extract from which we shall take leave of this ingenious, though desultory and irregular performance.

“There are few good patriots; few citizens that are always just: Why? Because men are not educated to be just; because the present morality, as I have just said, is nothing more than a jumble of gross errors and contradictions; because to be just, a man must have discernment, and we obscure in children the most obvious conception of the natural law.

“But are children capable of conceiving adequate ideas of justice? This I know, that if by the aid of a religious catechism we can engrave on the memory of a child articles of faith that are frequently the most absurd, we might consequently, by the aid of a moral catechism, there engrave the precepts of an equity, which daily experience would prove to be at once useful and true.

“From the moment we can distinguish pleasure from pain; from the moment we have done and received an injury, we have acquired some notion of justice.

“To form the most clear and precise ideas of justice, what is to be done? Ask ourselves.

Q. What is man?

A. An animal, said to be rational, but certainly sensible, weak, and formed to propagate his species.

Q. What should man do as an animal of sensibility?

A. Fly from pain, and pursue pleasure. It is to this constant flight and pursuit that is given the name of self-love.

Q. What should he also do as a weak animal?

A. Unite with other men, that he may defend himself against animals stronger than himself; or that he may secure a subsistence the beasts would dispute with him; or lastly, that he may surprise such of them as are to serve him for nourishment: from hence all the conventions relative to the chase and fisheries.

Q. What happens to man as being an animal formed to propagate his species?

A. That the means of subsistence diminish in proportion as the species is multiplied.

Q. What must he do in consequence?

A. When the lakes and the forests are exhausted of fish and game, he must seek new means of procuring subsistence.

Q. What are those means?

A. They are reduced to two. When the inhabitants are not yet very numerous, they breed cattle, and become pastors; but when they are vastly multiplied, and are obliged to find subsistence within a small compass, they must then cultivate the land, and become agriculturists.

Q. What does an improved cultivation of the land imply?

A. That men are already united in societies or villages, and have made compacts among themselves.

Q. What is the object of these compacts?

A. To secure the ox to his feeder, and the harrow to him that tills the land.

Q. What determines man to these compacts?

A. His interest and foresight. If there were another who could take the harvest from him who has ploughed the land and sowed the seed, no man would plough or sow; and the next year the village would be exposed to the horrors of a famine.

Q. What follows from the necessity of cultivation?

A. The necessity of property.

Q. How far do the compacts concerning property extend?

A. To my person, my thoughts, my life, my liberty, and my property.

Q. What follows from the compacts of property being once established?

A. Pains or punishments to be inflicted on those that violate them, that is, on the thief, the murderer, the fanatic, and the tyrant: abolish these punishments, and all compacts between men become void. From the moment any one can with impunity usurp the property of another, mankind return to the state of war; all society is dissolved, and men must fly from each other like lions and tigers.

Q. Are there punishments established in polished countries against the violaters of the law of property?

A. Yes; at least in all those where goods are not in common, that is, in almost all countries.

Q. What renders this right of property so sacred, and for what reason have they almost every where made a god of it under the name of *Termes*?

A. Because the preservation of property is the moral divinity of empires; as it there maintains domestic peace, and makes equity flourish; because men assemble but to secure their properties; because justice, which includes almost all virtues, consists in rendering to every one his own, and consequently may be reduced to the maintenance of the right of property; and because, lastly, the different laws have

never been any thing more than the different means of securing this right to the people.

Q. But should not thought be included in the number of properties, and what is then meant by that word?

A. The right, for example, of rendering that worship to God I think the most agreeable to him. Whoever deprives me of this right violates my property; and, whatever be his rank, he is punishable for it.

Q. Is there any case in which a prince may oppose the establishment of a new religion?

A. Yes, when it is intolerant.

Q. How is he then authorized?

A. By the public security: he knows that if such religion becomes dominant, it will become persecutive. Now the prince being charged with the happiness of his people, he ought to oppose the progress of such religion.

Q. But why cite justice as the root of all virtues?

A. Because from the moment that men, to secure their happiness, assemble in society, it is from justice that every one, by his good nature, humanity, and other virtues, contributes, as far as he can, to the felicity of that society.

Q. Supposing the laws of nature to be dictated by equity, what means are there of making them to be observed, and of exciting in the minds of the people a love of their country?

A. These means are the punishments inflicted for crimes, and the rewards assigned to virtues.

Q. What are the rewards for virtues?

A. Titles, honours, the public esteem, and all those pleasures of which that esteem is the representative.

Q. What are the punishments for crimes?

A. Sometimes death; often disgrace, accompanied with contempt.

Q. Is contempt a punishment?

A. Yes; at least in a free and well-governed country. In such a country the punishment of contempt is severe and dreadful; it is capable of keeping the great to their duty: the fear of contempt renders them just, active, and laborious.

Q. Justice ought, doubtless, to rule empires; it ought to reign by the laws. But are laws all of the same nature?

A. No: some of them are, so to say, invariable, and without which, society cannot subsist, or at least happily subsist: such are the fundamental laws of property.

Q. Is it sometimes permissible to violate them?

A. No: except in extraordinary circumstances, where the welfare of the country is concerned.

Q. By what right are they then violated?

A. By the general interest, which knows but one invariable law,

Salus populi suprema lex esto.

This axiom, says he, viz. that "the public good is the supreme law," is not only more general and explicit, but contains within

within it all that is salutary in the so much boasted maxim, "Do unto others as thou would have them do unto you:" which is only a secondary domestic maxim, insufficient to inform mankind of what they owe their country.

Our author's abuse of the clergy, we pass over as the effect of a resentment; which, however justly provoked, is not always equally just in bestowing even a merited castigation.

* * *

An Attempt to obviate the principal Objections made against the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; occasioned by Philaretus's Reply to Augustus Toplady. By Philalethes. 12mo. 6d. Bladon.

We are sorry that this little tract, published about twelve months ago *, has escaped our notice, till the reply of Philaretus to Mr. Toplady is almost forgotten †: and the more so, as Dr. Priestley hath just published an excellent treatise, on the same subject; by way of Appendix to his Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit. We should not do justice, however, to the present ingenious, though anonymous, writer, did we not give some account of his production, before we enter upon that of Dr. Priestley; which, for that reason, we defer till next month. The fact is that, although Dr. P's readiness of conception, facility of delivery, and happy talent at illustration, leave us hardly any thing to wish for, in regard to any subject he treats, the same propriety of ideas and solidity of argument are often to be met with in other writers. Thus, in the present little, sixpenny treatise, is contained almost every plea, of real consequence, in favour of, what Dr. Priestley properly calls, the great and glorious, but unpopular, doctrine of Philosophical Necessity.—It would take up too much room and time, to follow Philalethes in his pursuit and defeat of Philaretus; we shall, therefore, give only a few extracts, which affect the main points in dispute. On the nature of *volition*, he justly observes that,

"The mind doth not determine its own volitions; but, as the volitions are, so will it act, or forbear to act. Ideas and impressions, to which the mind is passive, appear to me the causes of volitions. A volition is not produced by an act of the mind, but an act of the mind by volition. There cannot, therefore, I presume, be any act of

* Not that we, or our bookseller, ever saw it advertised.

† See vol. III. of the London Review.

the mind without a volition, nor any act of it contrary to volition; if it were possible, such an act would not be a voluntary act.

This observation he illustrates as follows:

"Let any man consider, in a short time after any material action is past, whether, if he were once more put in the same rigidly exact circumstances as he was in the instant before he did it, he could possibly do otherwise than as he did.—Here the imagination will intervene, and be apt to deceive the enquirer, unless he be cautious; for, in this review, other motives, besides those which did actually influence him, will start up; and that especially if the act be such as he wishes to have been performed with more or less vigor, or not to have been performed at all: but, when these motives are set aside, and the imagination confined to those which did in fact take place, it will appear impossible, as it seems to me, that he should have done otherwise than the very thing he did."—"To suppose that the action A, or its contrary, A, can equally follow previous circumstances, that are exactly the same, appears to me the same thing as affirming that one or both of them might start up into being without any cause; which, if admitted, appears to me to destroy the foundation of all abstract reasoning, and particularly of that whereby the existence of the first cause is proved." *Hartley's Observations on Man.*

"It is customary to say, 'If I had known as much as I do now, I would not have done so or so.'—'Had I seen the thing in the light I now see it, I would not have consented to it.' This agrees strictly with philosophical necessity; but we always voluntarily act (if the word will not offend) according to the present view or appearance of things, and the motives most agreeable to the disposition of our minds. But it will, perhaps, be said, that the mind can suspend acting, and wait for more clear information; true, if the most agreeable motive, in the view of the mind, is, that it will be best to suspend acting: the determination of the mind, to suspend, is also the physical effect of our ideas and sensations.

We have here in a few words a full reply to monsieur Beguelia's whole treatise on the liberty of indifference, and the sagacious illustration of it by the *monthly* Reviewers. Not but that this reply will, itself, bear illustration; which our author accordingly gives in a separate chapter; for which we refer the curious reader to the work itself. In his second chapter our author shews that the effects of moral and physical causes are equally variable, and that motives and views necessarily produce volitions.

"Physical beings, acting on the organs, necessarily impress the mind with sensations, agreeable and disagreeable, or painful and pleasurable: and the operation of the same physical beings, on the organs of sense, affect the minds of different men differently, and the mind of the same man too, at different times, according to the different construction, texture, or physical state, of the organs, which are variable: hence the vulgar proverb, One man's food is another man's poison. Sweets, acids, and bitters, are agreeable to some men,

to others disagreeable; and we may, I think, "Account for moral as for natural things." On reading the holy scriptures, or any other scriptures, different men have different appearances, ideas, or perceptions, and notions, and the same men too, at different times, according to the state of their minds; and every man necessarily judges of moral, as well as of natural, things, by the impressions and ideas, or appearances, in his own mind; and can no more judge by other mens impressions and ideas, than he can see with other mens eyes, hear with their ears, or taste by their palates: hence men differ about both moral and natural doctrines, and conceive different, and even contrary, doctrines, from the same text. And thus I apprehend the most agreeable motives, which determine the judgement of one man, are sometimes the most disagreeable to some other men, and to the same man too, at different times; but, as we are apt to wonder that those moral or natural objects, which are agreeable to ourselves, are not agreeable to all other men, we are no less apt to conclude, that other men are deceived, and that we only are in the right; and we also apprehend that it is owing to want of taste, willful blindness, a corrupt heart, or inattention, that other men do not think as we think, and are not determined as we are determined; concluding it is in the power of others to determine themselves, as we think we determine ourselves. But we may as well wonder other men cannot see with our eyes, hear with our ears, or taste by our palates, as that some doctrines should appear glorious consolatory truths to some men, which other men deem as horrible.

To the paragraph immediately following, we shall take the liberty of entering a caveat.

"Let us now enquire by what means a stone falls. A stone is moved toward the center of the globe by the attraction of gravity. But what is gravity? Others may define and refine as long as they please, I believe they must at length acknowledge, that it is not a material unintelligent cause, or a creature. The will of God, which is the power of God, appointed that all bodies should gravitate, or move, toward some common center. Whatever he wills to exist, exists, and in the mode too which he wills it to exist in."

We by no means object to the use our author makes of the above reflection, in the illustration of his argument, or to his position, that whatever God wills to exist, exists in the mode assigned it. But we would not have the greatest adept in one science, set bounds to the knowledge of adepts in another. Philaethes is a much better metaphysician, than he is a natural philosopher. There are three general modes in which the Creator has willed all created beings to exist, viz. those of number, place, and time. All other particular modes are reducible to these; and though, we own, it would sound strange to call *gravity a creature*, we could ourselves, *we believe*, soon convince him, that it is an unintelligent cause, and as merely a mechanical effect as any that follows the action of the most obvious and palpable mechanic powers. But this
does

does not affect the present point, his reasoning on which our author concludes, thus,

"In order to establish the doctrine of free agency, I conceive it must be demonstrated that man is the efficient cause of his own volitions.—Action, or motion, necessarily follows a volition to act (all external impediments being removed); and therefore, unless man be the efficient cause of his own volitions, he cannot be the efficient cause of his actions or motions; i. e. he is not a self-determining being.

In chapter III; are discussed the questions respecting the absolute freedom of the deity, and the contingency of events, which are shewn to be incompatible with divine prescience.

In chapter IV is shewn, that man is no more an object of blame or commendation, on the hypothesis of *human liberty*, than on that of *philosophical necessity*; and that the origin of evil is full as difficult to account for, on the one hypothesis, as the other.

Philaretus had said, that

"A man can therefore be no more blameable for that action which necessarily results, with all its particular modes, from the vibrations of his brain, the motion of his blood, and flow of his animal spirits, than he is for those vibrations, &c. themselves.

To this Philaethes replies,

"The scriptures, indeed, speak of God's approving and disapproving, blaming and commending.—of his anger, wrath, and vengeance;—so they do of his talking, face to face, with a creature,—of his laughing, walking, riding, sitting, shewing his back-parts, repenting even till he was wearied with repenting, and of his being grieved to the heart; and every person accepts such texts, as well as all others in both sacred and profane writings, according to the sensations and ideas which they excite in his mind; and, as they are different in the minds of different men, and in the mind of the same man at different times, so they must accept them differently, unless there be also a freedom of human judgement; that is to say, of judging contrary to appearances.

If a man cannot help judging according to the appearance of things, and cannot determine himself but by the motives most agreeable to his disposition or state of mind, and it be not in his power to alter that state or those motives, does it not follow that this moral necessity, which is said to be consistent with liberty, is equal to a physical necessity? and that a man is no more blameable, or commendable, for determining himself to certain actions, than he is for the appearance of things, the agreeableness of motives, the vibrations of his brain, the motion of his blood, or the flow of his animal spirits? for, if a man determines himself by the most agreeable motives, he has not, I think, properly speaking, a liberty of contradiction or contrariety.

In chap. V, Philaethes treats of modern right and wrong, endeavouring to shew that *evil* is the effect of God's *goodness*. Paradoxical as this position may seem, the argument is a good

one, on the supposition that evil is absolutely necessary, and God absolutely good. "The doctrine of necessity," Philaretus said, "makes God directly the author of all the evil in the "world."—To this Philaethes answers,

"Far be it from me to intend, by any thing I have said or shall say, to make God the author of evil, in the sense which Philaretus supposes to follow from the doctrine of necessity: I detest the idea; and, if any of my positions imply it, I do declare it was not intended by me. Philaretus, indeed, supposes that God could have prevented evil; but to me it appears a contradiction, the object of no power. If Philaretus were to ask me why I think it a contradiction, I should answer, because God did not prevent it; for I conclude, that, if a God of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, could have prevented it, he would not have wanted a will to prevent it.

"To give pain to any being, is a material evil; but, if the design of the agent who inflicted it be ultimately to communicate a greater good, which could not have been communicated without inflicting it, the inflicting pain (a material evil) is a formal good.—Suppose that a man is capable of communicating 10 degrees of pleasure to some other man, and yet that it could not be communicated without subjecting him to 2 degrees of pain, would it not be deemed a virtuous benevolent act, in him, to communicate the 10 degrees of pleasure, though he should necessarily subject him to the 2 degrees of pain?

"It is reputed a degree of virtue, amongst men, for one man to communicate any degree of good, designedly, to any other man or men; and, if he designedly communicates the greatest degree which he is capable of communicating, it is reputed in him, the greatest degree of human virtue:—may we not hence infer, analogically, that the supreme being, the common father of us all, who is inherently wise and good, will communicate the greatest possible degree of good, i. e. happiness, to every species of sentient creatures, which they are capable of?

We fear the advocates for philosophical necessity, have not sufficiently cleared away the rubbish from the spot, on which they would erect a structure on the ruins of human liberty. Formally as we subscribe, as arithmeticians, to the balance of the above account, we object to the mode of calculation; and, temerarious as we may be thought, we object, as *philosophers*, to the analogical inference of God's doing every thing for the best, and his design to communicate happiness to his creatures.—As philosophers we believe, and can give a reason for our belief, that in this transitory life, the quantum of pain and pleasure of all God's creatures is perfectly equal; and that his goodness or design to make them happy, is a doctrine that must depend, like that of a future state, on the sanction only of divine revelation.—The notion that "partial evil is "universal good" is proper only to proceed from the noddle of a poet.—Good and evil and merely relative terms, and if they compen-

compensate for each other, it is all that can *philosophically* be expected. Good and happiness are, in our author's estimation, synonymous terms; but happiness, as Hume says, is totally out of the question.—We cannot yet take leave of this ingenious production, without noticing a little inconsistency, arising from the desire of thinking God philosophically good. “I am,” says Philaletbes, “no calvinist.” His good God is much obliged to him for his good opinion. Is it possible the deity could be a *good* God if he had?—But why will we level our Creator with his creatures? shame on the pride and presumption of man!—In reasoning, from his works, as philosophers, let us trace the marks of his truth and justice, with the humility becoming our weakness; in believing his revealed will, as christians, let us embrace the offers of his goodness with a gratitude becoming the adopted heirs of felicity: but, let us not, like hypocrites, affect to adore his goodness where we do not find it; or, like ungrateful infidels, refuse to accept it, where it is graciously, so gloriously, offered,

K.

Remarks on Mr. Forster's Account of Captain Cook's last Voyage round the World, in the Years 1772, 1773, 1774 and 1775. By William Wales, F. R. S. Astronomer on Board the Resolution, in that Voyage, under the Appointment of the Board of Longitude. 8vo. 1s. 6d. Nourse.

Our readers may remember that, on the first appearance of Mr. Forster's account, which was published some time before that of Captain Cook, we signified our apprehensions of there being something unfair and illiberal in the publication *. These apprehensions are fully confirmed by the remarks before us; as well as the conjectures, we had formed from the invidious cast of the whole of Mr. Forster's performance. It was a little unlucky, therefore, in him to cite from De Missy, the passage, which Mr. Wales very pertinently retorts on him, and takes for the motto to his own pamphlet.

On ne repousse point la verité sans bruit;
Et de quelque façon qu' on l'arrête au passage,
On verra tôt ou-tard que c'étoit un orage
Dont il falloit qu' au moins la Honte le fruit,

* See London Review for March and April 1777.

For the publication of these remarks Mr. Wales makes the following apology.

"There are few situations wherein a peaceable man finds himself less at ease than when involved in a dispute; and nothing less than personal provocations could have induced me to take up my pen on this occasion. Mistakes in philosophy might, for me, have remained long uncontradicted; and I am not certain that even nautical and geographical ones, which, in my opinion, are of infinitely more consequence than the former, would have drawn me into a dispute, at least with Dr. Forster and his son. I have been farther stimulated by the ill-natured remarks, which have been frequently made in consequence of these misrepresentations, both in writing and conversation, on the conduct of those who were concerned in the voyage; which, as they are founded on misrepresentations, are the more provoking to persons who find themselves injured by them. It is true, I am, perhaps, as little concerned in them as any person who was on board; but many others, whom I have every reason to love and esteem, are particularly pointed at; and, what is more, are not now present to defend themselves; on which account, I esteem it more my duty to take it up.

Perhaps some apology may be thought necessary for attributing the account of the voyage, which has been published under the name of Mr. George Forster, to his father. But, notwithstanding Mr. George Forster's name stands both in the title page and at the end of the preface, and the Doctor, his father, appears but in the second or third person, there can be but little doubt that he had the principal hand in it. For, besides that the work is confessedly drawn up with his knowledge and approbation, there are many evident marks, either that the Doctor has lent more assistance than *barely* his journal, or that it has been so faithfully copied, as to leave no doubt that it contains both his *language* and sentiments; and the whole book is written with so much arrogance, self-consequence, and asperity, and the actions of persons are decided on in so peremptory and dogmatical a manner, that I cannot suppose it to be the production of a young man scarcely twenty years of age. For the credit therefore of the young gentleman, as well as for the propriety of referring the merits of every performance to its proper author, I shall, throughout the following pages, express myself as if it was actually written by the father, but published in the name of the son, for reasons of convenience, which are hinted at in their preface.

These reasons are examined with some asperity in the course of the pamphlet: for which the following is the Remarker's excuse.

"It is not easy for a person, who finds both himself and his friends injured in so tender a point as their reputation, and especially without any just cause, to suppress his emotions, or to express himself at all times with that moderation he could wish; and, if there is a situation wherein a man may be allowed to give voice to his feelings, as Dr. Forster expresses himself, it is certainly this."

As to the objects in dispute, Mr. Wale observes,

"It must be allowed to be a difficult matter to refute a person who pretends to relate matters of fact, unless by the concurrent testimony of other persons who were present, and who may be supposed no ways interested in the affair. And Dr. Forster himself, seems to have been aware of this: he has therefore, in many places, involved the whole ship's company, officers and men, in one universal censure of ignorance, brutality, cruelty, wantonness, and barbarity, and has, at one time or other, taken care to brand every one of us with such crimes, and stigmatize us with such epithets, as would, were they true, render us undeserving the least confidence. Fortunately, however, Dr. Forster's own narrative will, in many places, serve to confute himself, by only opposing one passage to another, and by stripping others of the reflections, exclamations, and terms of reproach, with which he has been pleased to load the objects of his displeasure."

"It will undoubtedly be asked, what motives Dr. Forster could have for misrepresenting matters of this nature, as men do not often go out of the right road to asperse others without a cause? It must be presumed that Dr. Forster has received, as he himself more than intimates, some grievous provocations from every one of those who sailed with him, to induce him to act in this manner. I have no doubt, but that Dr. Forster might think he had sufficient provocation: we are all apt to judge favourably in our own. What that supposed provocation was, I shall endeavour to shew, and leave the Public to judge, whether it was a real provocation or not; or, in case it was, whether he is to be justified for treating those who gave it, in the manner which he has done.

"Dr. Forster and his son, by the merest chance, and the greatest good fortune in the world, had been appointed, immediately before we left England, to go the voyage, with almost an unexampled reward; which had been procured from parliament for another person, who, for some reasons that need not here be mentioned, did not chuse to go. Such an unexpected piece of good fortune, after having been refused, as he himself told us, a very moderate stipend as assistant to Mr. Banks, had raised his expectations and ideas to such a pitch, that, on coming on board the *Resolution* at Plymouth, he did not find either the attention paid him, or the accommodations which had been provided for him, by any means equal to what he thought were his due. He examined the cabins of the officers and other persons, who had been appointed before him; and finding some of them, in his opinion, rather more commodious than his own, told them, in a manner to which they had been little accustomed, that, if he had been appointed sooner, or had an opportunity of examining into the affair, he would have had theirs instead of his own: and he even went so far as to affront others, by offering them money to exchange with him: I mention, as particular instances, Mr. Cooper, the first lieutenant, whom he offered 100*l.* to exchange with him, and myself. We had scarce got out to sea, before he quarrelled with Mr. Gilbert, the master, and treated him in a very ungentle manner, because he did not chuse to give up part of the space which had been assigned by the

the Commissioners of the navy for his cabin, that the Doctor might enlarge his own with it; and, what was yet more extraordinary, when he found he could not obtain it, was even guilty of so much folly as to threaten him with complaining to the k—g at his return; and he assured us, that he had interest enough to prevail on his majesty to discard him for ever from his service. A threat, which he was so weak as to employ against almost every person on board the ship at one time or other, and so often, that it became a bye word amongst the seamen, whom I have frequently heard threaten one another with the same dreadful denunciation on the most common and trifling occasions. Can it be supposed, that such a man did not render himself cheap, and that he would not sometimes find the ill consequence of being so? I have before said, that Dr. Forster came on board at Plymouth, with very exalted notions of himself: in consequence of which, he was continually making comparisons between himself and the officers, not much to their advantage; or, it may well be supposed, in their opinion, very consistent with truth and politeness. Neither did the common people shew him sufficient respect, of which he made frequent and very ill-natured complaints to the captain. They also disturbed his rest with their noise, singing, and, as he says, perhaps sometimes with swearing. And who does not know that sailors will sometimes both sing and swear?

“On these, and similar occasions, I believe, Dr. Forster never passed a week on board the *Resolution* without a dispute with one person or other: and in his part of those quarrels, he was seldom very choice either in the manner or delivery of his expressions. Matters of this nature, frequently repeated, soon gave both officers and people a bad opinion of him, and it is not to be wondered at, if, in consequence thereof, they sometimes treated him with less ceremony than he would otherwise have had a right to expect. This, at least, is certain, there were but few who would go much out of their way to oblige him in things to which their duty did not compel them. In short, before we reached New Zealand the first time, there was scarce a man in the ship whom he had not quarrelled with on one pretence or other. It does not indeed absolutely follow, that Dr. Forster was always the aggressor; but it is a pretty general, and, I believe, a very true observation, that when one person quarrels with every other in company, he cannot always be, and in fact very seldom is, in the right: it may therefore be fairly inferred, that this was the case with Dr. Forster, and he has, himself, fully satisfied the Public by his publication, that out of near 120 persons who were on board the *Resolution*, there were scarce two whom he can afford to speak well of.”

Such, says Mr. Wales, was the provocation for that revenge * which Dr. Forster has taken of the whole crew of the *Resolution*, in his account of the voyage. The particulars of this revenge our Remarker proceeds particularly to enumerate and specify, by no means to the advantage of either the candour or veracity of Dr. Forster. Not but the placability of the doc-

* Revenge, says Mr. Forster, is a *useful* and *sacred* passion.

tor, in regard to the parties offending him, appears in his not actually putting in execution his terrible threat, of *telling the king* of them: a threat which it seems he made use of to Mr. Wales himself; a circumstance, which, the latter pleasantly adds, he was very glad of, "not knowing how, otherwise, his name could ever reach the ear of his majesty."—Of Dr. Forster's asserted wilful misrepresentations, of the facts and circumstances attending this famous voyage, and Capt. Cook's account of it, we shall give our readers an instance, in what relates to the pretended motive for publishing Dr. Forster's, and of the insinuations, thrown out by the former against the latter; of which we ourselves expressed an early disapprobation. These are again as justly and severely censured by Mr. Wales; who adds,

"I have no design to suppress here the *two well known facts*, as the Doctor is pleased to call them, which he has brought to prove that *important observations* have been suppressed in the accounts of former voyages. I shall give them in his own words. "The same authority," says he, "which blew off M. de Bougainville from the island of Juan Fernandez, could hush to silence the British guns, whilst the Endeavour cannonaded the Portuguese fort at Madeira."—"The two circumstances, here alluded to, are *well known facts*, though suppressed in the published narratives. M. de Bougainville *spent some time* at Juan Fernandez, and completely refreshed his crew there, though he wishes to have it understood that contrary winds prevented his touching at that island. Captain Cook, in the Endeavour, battered the Loo-fort at Madeira, in conjunction with an English frigate, thus resenting an affront which had been offered to the British flag." Here are two solemn and direct assertions! I am authorised by Lieutenants Pickersgill and Smith, and some other gentlemen, who were in the Endeavour, to declare, that there is not the least foundation for the latter of them; and that, to the best of their remembrance, the Endeavour did not fire a single gun, on any account whatever, whilst she was at Madeira! We have not altogether such direct proof of the falsehood of the former; but I am persuaded such may be brought as will satisfy every person of candour and penetration. In the first place, M. de Bougainville says positively he did *not* go there: and I have so good an opinion of M. de Bougainville's integrity, as to think he would not assert a direct, wilful, and unnecessary falsehood; especially as it would be so easy to detect him. I say unnecessary, because, if M. de Bougainville did really touch there, and wished it not to be known, his best way would manifestly have been not to have mentioned it.

"But there are other, and much more substantial proofs to be brought that he never was there; and to which it is amazing Dr. Forster, as the translator of that voyage, should not have attended. We find M. de Bougainville in the Straits of Magellan on the 26th of January in the evening; and on the 14th of February he is in lat. 27° 7' S. and long. 104° 12' W. having in those 19 days made near 2000 miles on a direct course, which is as much as can be supposed that any ship will make good, at least in a variable wind's way. How then could

could M. de Bougainville have spent *some time* (in this interval) at Juan Fernandez, and completely refreshed his crew, seeing that, if he had made that place in his way, he must have run, on a direct course, near 45 leagues, or 135 miles every day, which is much more than we can suppose any single ship will do for so many days together. How then could two ships, in comfort, do it, and yet lie several days in a port? Will not these remarks "give an adequate idea of a performance" where no regard, either to truth or probability, is preserved, even in the preface?

In looking over M. de Bougainville's account of his voyage, and also the translation by Dr. Forster, I could not help observing the Doctor's boast, that, amongst many other advantages, which the maps in the English edition have over the original French ones, they are infinitely more accurate. The singularity of pretending to correct the original maps of a man who laid them down from his own experience, by one who had never been near the place, struck me so forcibly, that I took the trouble of comparing them together, but could not discover any material difference in this respect, except that almost all the islands in the South Seas are laid down by Dr. Forster, from a quarter of a degree to 20 miles more to the northward than M. Bougainville has done. And I will take upon me to assert, from my own observations, that the original maps are right, and that Dr. Forster's are wrong by all that quantity."

We wonder Mr. Wales should be so forcibly struck at the above pretensions to superior sagacity in Dr. Forster, when he gives us a similar instance of his knowing the name of one of the South-sea islands, better than did the natives themselves, who gave it that name. It happens extremely unlucky, even for Dr. Forster's moral character, that he should so violently exclaim against the barbarity and profligacy of the seamen for robbing and shooting at the thieving natives; for wanton amours with their women, and for swearing and singing on Christmas day; when we are told that both he and his son had their amours at Ulitea; that the doctor himself swears at times most outrageously, and was twice confined during the voyage for acts of outrage on the natives. But we shall give the latter charge in Mr. Wales's own words. After proving a number of his ill-natured reflections on the captain and crew of the Resolution to be false, he proceeds.

"The reader will, no doubt, be greatly surprised to be told, that this mighty advocate for the natives of the South Sea Isles, this detester of every species of cruelty, and paragon of humanity, as he has represented himself, was twice confined, in the course of the voyage, for wanton and unprovoked acts of cruelty to the natives. Once by Captain Cook, for shooting (as I was told) at the natives of Ulitea; a set of people who, he has himself assured us, are the most harmless and inoffensive, and, at the same time, the most hospitable and generous

that

that are any where to be met with, and whose behaviour was, at all times, so cautious and circumspect, as never once to provoke *even the sailors* to treat them ill, notwithstanding the known ease with which (as the Doctor says) they are provoked to sport with the lives of their fellow creatures. The second time was by Lieutenant (now Captain) Clerke, for spurning with his foot, and spitting in the face of one of the natives of Tanna; and the provocation, as far as I could gather from his dispute with the man, was, because he had led him a long way to shew him the nutmeg-tree, and through misapprehension, as it appeared to me, had given him the name of the leaf for the name of the tree itself, and had afterwards the audacity to insist on some reward for his labour."

Dr. Forster may be a little excusable in both the above instances. Nobody may know what private provocation he might have received from the good-natured natives of Ulitea, to induce him to gratify that *useful* and *sacred* passion of revenge. And then as for the rascally *simpler* of Tanna, Mr. Wales might himself have found an excuse for the doctor, in the story he tells of the *simplers* of Ulitea.

"The natives, who were indeed very willing to oblige every one of us, took great pains to run even to the tops of the highest mountains to procure him specimens of plants, and had often observed, that he was very peevish, and threw away those which had no flowers on them. One Sunday they had climbed a very high hill, to get some ferns which grew there; but finding none which had flowers, and not knowing the reason; and moreover fearing, I suppose, that they would lose their reward, and perhaps be treated very rudely into the bargain, if they brought none which had, they contrived, very artfully, to stick a pretty flower, not much unlike that of a primrose, on the tops of several, and brought them to him. These he shewed to almost every one of the ship as a very wonderful *lusus naturæ* amongst the fern tribe. until some person (I think Dr. Sparman) more sceptical than himself, would needs examine them, and by that means found out the deception, which produced, to be sure, a hearty laugh at the Doctor's expense; but he is unjust in placing this to the account of any person on board the ship, as he must know that it was the device of the natives alone, and that no one belonging to the ship knew any more of it than himself."

But we must here take our leave of this severe, though apparently just, castigation of Dr. Forster; not only lamenting, with Mr. Wales, that man in general is so heterogeneous and imperfect a being; but that there should not be found *Englishmen* enow able and willing to prosecute our voyages of discovery, without having recourse to vagabond foreigners, generally as conceited and obstinate of disposition as superficial and ignorant of Science.

W.

Fabulae

Fabulæ Selectæ Auctore Johanne Gay Latine redditæ.—Select Fables by Mr. Gay, translated into Latin. 8vo. No Author or Bookseller's Name.

The fables here translated are in number eighteen, including the introduction; and are dedicated to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. How far the Latin version is worthy of the original English, we leave the classical reader to determine from the following specimen; which we insert, together with the original, as they are printed in the publication before us. In the choice of this fable, however, we have no peculiar motive of preference.

F A B U L A VIII.

S I M I U S

Qui mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes. HOR.

“ UT fratrum emendet mores, et corrigat ævum,
Ardet in externum Simius ire solum;
Quippe hominum mos est gentes lustrare remotas,
Ut patriam urbanâ rectiùs arte colant:
Ergo iter aggreditur; nulla illum incommoda terrent:
Quisque suis discit cautior esse malis.

In laqueos tandem cadit, et deductus ad urbem,
Pauper in ignotâ venditur hospes humo,
Venditur at dominæ, quali servire libenter
Quis neget? aut quis non simius esse velit?
Hic parat obsequio studium, fruiturque catenâ,
Ceu, quibus inservit, vincula jactat amans:

F A B L E VIII.

THE MONKEY

Who had seen the World.

“ A Monkey, to reform the times,
Resolv'd to visit foreign climes;
For men in distant regions roam,
To bring politer manners home:
So forth he fares, all toil defies:
Misfortune serves to make us wise.

At length the treacherous snare was laid;
Poor Pug was caught, to town convey'd,
There sold. (How envy'd was his doom,
Made captive in a lady's room!)
Proud as a lover of his chains,
He day by day her favour gains:

Mimicus

Mimicus exercet ludos, ubicunque puellam
 Ad speculi studium cura diurna vocat;
 Colligit in nodum vitas, versatque flabellum,
 Perfectique vices ardelionis agit;
 Sæpe gravi argutos struit in sermone lepores,
 Risum sæpe, joco deficiente, movet;
 Inflatus donec plausu, perfectus ad unguem,
 Et consummatus jam sibi visus homo est;
 Tum patriæ pius urit amor; tunc ardet, ut Orpheus;
 Indigenarum animos posse docere rudes;
 Temporaque apta petens, vincli retinacula rumpit,
 Et nemus ad patrium, notaque lustra redit.

 Admirata habitum, gestumque, hirsuta caterva,
 Concurfat patriis præcipitata jugis;
 Pars nitidis plaudit manicis; pars serica laudat
 Tegmina, queis limbos dædala pinxit acus;
 Concinni nil non delectat forma galeri,
 Nigraque ab ambrosiis pendula cauda comis,
 Terga superjecto redolentia pulvere adorant,
 Terga pruinali candidiora nive;
 Fimbria sed lævo quam dat volitare lacerto,
 Arridet cunctis, invidiamque movet:

Whene'er the duty of the day
 The toilet calls; with mimic play
 He twirls her knots, he cracks her fan,
 Like any other gentleman;
 In visits too his parts and wit,
 When jests grew dull, were sure to hit;
 Proud with applause, he thought his mind
 In every courtly art refin'd;
 Like Orpheus burnt with public zeal,
 To civilize the Monkey weal;
 So watch'd occasion, broke his chain,
 And sought his native woods again.

The hairy sylvans round him press,
 Astonish'd at his strut and dress;
 Some praise his sleeve; and others glote
 Upon his rich embroider'd coat;
 His dapper perriwig commending,
 With the black tail behind depending,
 His powder'd back, above, below,
 Like hoary frost, or fleecy snow;
 But all, with envy and desire,
 His flutt'ring shoulder-knot admire:

Me me, adsum, petulanter ait, me audite, catervæ;
 Et sapere et rectè vivere quisque sciat;
 Virtutis propriæ memores estote, gradumque
 Sumite; vix homini turba secunda fumus;
 Diis grates! urbana inter confortia vixi,
 Nec queror ignavos præteritis dies;
 Hunc habitum, faciemque notate; his rictibus uti
 Plurimus humano simius ore solet.
 Discite adulari, rem sic augere licebit;
 Sitque odium, atque iras dissimulare labor;
 Se totum dare quisque suis videatur amicis,
 At proprio solum consulat ipse bono.
 Ut decet, et mos est, mendacia fingite; nunquam
 Ingenii nimia vena sit arcta fide;
 Non levis alterius merita est aspergere virtus;
 Gravior alloquio queritur inde decor;
 Omnia vos audete, atque omnia scire ad amissim
 Dicite, et ingenii gloria major erit;
 Magnorum hic mos est; colite hæc; et simius omnia
 Inclytus, atque, hominum more, politus erit.
 Dixit, et incurvatus humi est. Horrenda cachinnans
 Eloquentium ricta tota corona probat:

Hear and improve, he pertly cries;
 I come to make a nation wise;
 Weigh your own worth, support your place,
 The next in rank to human race;
 In cities long I pass'd my days,
 Convers'd with men, and learn'd their ways;
 Their dress, their courtly manners see;
 Reform your state, and copy me.
 Seek ye to thrive? in flattery deal;
 Your scorn, your hate, with that conceal:
 Seem only to regard your friends,
 But use them for your private ends.
 Stint not to truth the flow of wit;
 Be prompt to lie whenever 'tis fit;
 Bend all your force to spatter merit;
 Scandal is conversation's spirit;
 Boldly to every thing pretend,
 And men your talents shall commend;
 I knew the great; observe me right;
 So shall you grow like man polite.

He spoke and bow'd. With muttering jaws
 The wondering circle grinn'd applause:

Rodere quisque suos hinc finius ardet amicos.

Ultriceque iras perfidiamque fovet;

Atque hominum pravas imitari sedulus artes,

Incubat insidiis, invigilatque malo.

Sic, schola quem pudit, Phœbo procerus iniquo,

Stultitiam externo perficit orbe puer;

Vestibus inservit, ludit, bibit, omnia scæda

Perpetrat, ut belli sit sibi fama viri;

Seria deridet, studia averfatur honesta,

Ingenio vitium convenit; et sequitur."

Now, warm'd with malice, envy, spite,
Their most obliging friends they bite;
And, fond to copy human ways,
Practise new mischiefs all their days.

Thus the dull lad, too tall for school,
With travel finishes the fool;
Studious of every coxcomb's airs,
He drinks, games, dresses, whores, and swears;
O'erlooks with scorn all virtuous arts,
For vice is fitted to his parts."

Essays, Moral and Literary. 8vo. 4s. 6d. Dilly.

From the desire of affording entertainment, as well as literary information, to our readers, we were induced to promise a continuation of our extracts from these ingenious Essays. On a retrospect, however, to the publications, which lie unreviewed on our hands, and the prospect of a plentiful season of new ones approaching, we must dismiss it with only one quotation more; in which this sensible writer figures as a politician.

On the bad Consequences of National Avarice.

"There have been those who have seriously maintained, that Avarice, however it may debase the character and contract the notions of individuals, is beneficial to the community. That private vices are public benefits, is an opinion so injurious to the cause of virtue, that though it should be admitted by the speculative politician, it were to be wished, that it could always be refuted by the defenders of morality.

"Avarice, however, differs in its operation from other vices. To individuals it is said to be advantageous, as it prevents the indulgence of luxurious appetites. To the public it is hurtful, because it confines, in a state of stagnation, that money which should circulate in the body politic, and diffuse health and vigour through every part.

"The

"The parsimonious man approaches so nearly to a state of nature, that besides food and raiment, he scarcely knows a want. Of the elegances, the embellishments, and the enjoyments of life, he has no desire, because they are necessarily attended with expence. The mere wants of nature are easily supplied by the natural productions of a country, and with these the miser is contented. He, therefore, contributes nothing to foreign trade, which supplies not only the superfluities of life, but is the most fertile source of public opulence. The merchant does not penetrate to the remotest Indies to bring home commodities which cloathe the naked, or feed the hungry; but which furnish splendour, ease, and pleasure, to the wealthy, the voluptuous, and the luxurious. These articles may, perhaps, destroy the health, debilitate the minds, and corrupt the morals, of individuals; but they increase the finances of the state, and give it power in war, and dignity in peace.

"A visionary philosopher, as he would be called by the statesman, may perhaps object to the opinion, that luxury is beneficial to the public, because it is hurtful to individuals, who, indeed, constitute the community, and because the happiness of individuals ought to be the ultimate view of rational government: but let it be remembered, that we do not live in an Utopia, and that if we would avoid mere empty speculation, we must form our ideas, as well as regulate our actions as far as virtue will permit, according to received notions and prevalent manners. It is indeed to be wished, that we could emulate the excellence of a Spartan Republic; but since this can only be wished, it remains that we make the best use of things as they are, and adopt our plans to present circumstances and situations. Besides, by the benefits accruing to a state from luxury, must be understood the benefits accruing to its finances, its power, its splendour, and not to its morals, its virtues, and its police. Nothing, therefore, advanced on this subject must be thought to recommend intemperance and profusion.

"In all civilized countries, where progressive refinement continually introduces unnecessary wants, there will ever be a great number of artificers who are solely supported by furnishing articles, which, though sought for with avidity, and purchased at a great price, administer only to the caprice of luxury, and the wantonness of pleasure. The manufacturer thrives, he rears a family, he teaches them his art; till at length, these artificers of superfluity become one of the most numerous bodies in the community. Should the demand for their manufactures cease, thousands would be immediately reduced to extreme want, and the state overrun with members not only useless, but burthensome. Whenever the gold and diamond, which adorn the gay and the fair, shall be no longer prized, and the rich garment be laid aside for the homely cloak, myriads of hands, which by honest labour procured bread for a numerous progeny, will be lifted up in supplication for eleemosynary relief. To other occupations they could not turn themselves, because many of them would become equally unnecessary, and because those which should not be so would be already full.

"The truest opulence of a nation is populousness; but the poor will not be induced to settle in domestic life, and raise a numerous family, whom they know they cannot support by industry, but must see them become objects of charity, or perish for want of that little which

simple nature requires. Marriage, which in a civil, moral, and religious view, is the most advantageous and proper intercourse of the sexes, will no longer be entered upon by the lower orders of the community. The concupiscent passions will, however, remain importunate for gratification, and illicit commerce will be the natural consequence: but the diseases and infirmities arising from universal debauchery, will ultimately put an effectual stop to population. The offspring of promiscuous embraces will not only be inconsiderable, but, in the end, weak, sickly, deformed, and short-lived.

"National profusion, it may be said, occasions the same evils among the rich and great, which national Avarice inflicts on the poor: but the rich and great are by far the least numerous part of the state; and some have ventured to assert, that their total extinction might be supplied, without inconvenience, by the lower orders. Add to this, that the opulent have it in their power to be prudently luxurious, and to indulge in the gratifications of profusion, without suffering all its consequences. If they do suffer from it, they may be said to deserve their sufferings, since they might avoid them by caution and discretion: but this cannot be true of the evils which the poor would sustain from national Avarice, for they would be as unavoidable as unalleviated.

"The wants of luxury stimulate to action, and excite industry; while the wants of nature, from their paucity and the facility of supplying them, suffer the powers both of mind and body to sink into torpidity. If we take a view of some neighbouring nations, the peculiarity of whose political constitutions occasions a general poverty among the lower ranks, and consequently prohibits an universal luxury, we shall find the greater part dragging a listless life of indolence, without a wish for distinction, or a desire of meliorating their condition.

"Those countries of Turkey which constituted antient Greece, exhibit a melancholy proof of the extreme degeneracy to which human nature may be reduced, when precluded, by slavery and want, from merchandize and its consequences, expensive and luxurious pleasures. It cannot be supposed, that the universal stupidity and want of spirit, which is remarkable among those people, proceeds from an inferiority of natural powers, but from an habitual indolence. Nor can this indolence be attributed to any other cause than to a want of proper objects to excite the passions of hope and fear—those necessary incentives to every laudable pursuit and useful undertaking: and these proper objects can alone arise from universal liberty, and universal luxury. It is well known to those who are but superficially acquainted with modern history, that the little Republic of Holland, however circumscribed in its extent, and, comparatively with the oriental nations, thinly inhabited, has produced greater men, has been more successful in war, and has accumulated more real wealth, than the whole Ottoman empire. Nor can such an event be matter of wonder to those who reflect, that in Holland a spirit of merchandize, universally prevalent, has excited a spirit of luxury, which still prompts the unwearying adventurer to new efforts, which, in the end, enrich himself and aggrandize his country.

"Upon

"Upon a review of antient Rome, we observe, that she was indeed virtuous, valiant, and wise, under consuls who were taken from the plough; but that she was opulent, invincible, and, in short, mistress of the world, under those who would not hesitate to squander the produce of a province upon a supper, or to lavish the revenues of a kingdom upon a concubine. It was at this period, that she excelled in arts—a world which she had conquered by arms. Had she constantly persevered in her pristine temperance, she might, indeed, have exacted the admiration of philosophers, and her inhabitants as individuals would have been happier; but she would never have surpassed all other nations in power and wealth, those political advantages, which are to be considered as independent of the happiness of single members, and as unconnected with morality: but it must not be left unnoticed, that the luxury and extravagance which contributed to her aggrandizement, did at last, by the corruption of individuals, occasion her downfall.

"A Solon, or a Lycurgus, may invent in his retirement a code of laws, and a system of government, in which intemperance and profusion shall be prohibited; but if he expects that a strict observance of his institutions will render his Republic superior to its rivals in wealth, as well as virtue, he will infallibly be disappointed. The two Grecian states, of which these great men were the legislators, though one of them became unrivalled in military discipline and austere virtue, and the other produced the greatest heroes, poets, and philosophers, the world ever knew, were never distinguished by the extent of their territories, or the abundance of their revenues. Persia, where luxury was carried to the extreme, and where even the names of the virtues were almost unknown, not only surpassed Athens and Sparta in power, but conquered the world. Effeminate as the Persians were from the warmth of their climate, and the delicacy of their manners; yet did their love of pleasure, and the spirit of luxury, occasion such a multiplication of the members of that state, as enabled it to send myriads into the field, and sometimes to overcome, by mere superiority of number, the efforts of ingenuity and valour. Greece, however, relaxed the severity of her manners, and, under the conduct of a Macedonian, easily subdued the oriental nations, whom she greatly excelled in military discipline and conduct.

"If, after the contemplation of foreign States, we turn our attention to our native country, we shall find reason to conjecture, that the power of opulence, by which it at present rivals antient Rome, would soon dwindle to poverty and insignificance, if sumptuary laws were to preclude that luxury and extravagance which prevail through every rank of the community. The produce of the Indies, which pours in an annual tide of wealth, as it consists entirely of superfluities, could indeed easily be dispensed with. Individuals would, perhaps, in time, be happier without them; but the body politic, as it now is constituted, would soon shew symptoms of a hasty consumption."

The Rise, Progress, and present State of the Northern Governments; viz. The United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Poland: or, Observations on the Nature, Constitution, Religion, Laws, Policy, Customs, and Commerce of each Government; the Manners and Dispositions of the People; their Military Forces by Land and Sea; the Revenues and Resources of each Power; and on the Circumstances and Conjunctions which have contributed to produce the various Revolutions which have happened in them. The whole digested from the most authentic Records and Histories, and from the Reflections and Remarks made during a Tour of Five Years through these Nations. By J. Williams, Esq. 2 vol. 4to. 1l. 4s. Becket.

It is very justly observed by this writer, that " mankind were never more fond of reading than they are at this time in many parts of Europe. " For which reason, says he, there, undoubtedly, never were so many books published in any age as in the present." We are sorry to find him add, that " there is notwithstanding very little information imparted." In fact, we are the more sorry, as, having perused the volumes before us fairly through, Mr. Williams seems to stand in much the same predicament with other modern writers; our own stock of information at least being very little increased by such perusal. The great variety of subjects, indeed, treated of within so small a compass, render it, in a manner, impossible they should present much that is new. The extent of the author's design is, perhaps, his best apology in this instance.

" My original design, says he, is to examine into the origin and present state of the Northern Governments; and it will be necessary in the execution of this great plan to give a brief account of the rise and progress of each particular state, to lay open the nature and constitution of their respective governments, to observe what is peculiar to them in their situation or disposition and what in their religion; to take a survey of their trade and the sources of it, of the manners and customs of the people of each state, and of the forces and revenues which have aggrandized each particular government, and the circumstances and conjunctions which have contributed to produce the various revolutions that have happened in it. These are the principal heads upon which the order and arguments in the several parts of this work will be founded."

After this enumeration of the circumstances to be treated of respecting each particular state; if the reader be told that all the writer has to say of the *first*, the Republic of Holland, is contained in about 120 loosely-printed pages, we are persuaded his expectations will not be very highly raised, in regard to the

the quantity of information it contains. As to the *qualities* of it, viz. its importance and authenticity; if we give credit to the writer's pretensions in his preface, they are less exceptionable. Speaking of the celebrated historian of Ferney, he says, "Voltaire tells us, in his history of the Russian empire, that this science was never more in want of authentic documents than it is in our days, when authors so insolently make a traffic of lying; and laments the miserable situation of the press in Holland, and other places, where a bookseller commands a book as a manufacturer commands a piece of cloth; and unhappily, says he, there are many authors whom necessity compels to sell their writings to these tradesmen as a labourer does the fruit of his toil to those who employ him: and to make mankind believe that his history was superior in this respect to all others, this author tells us, that the court of St. Peterbourg had sent him all the authentic papers necessary for such a work, which were to be preserved in the public library of Geneva. I own I could not help smiling on reading this well written history, for certainly there never was a work of this kind laid before the public that is so full of errors; and if we may depend upon his veracity with respect to those public papers which he pretends were transmitted to him from Russia, never was a writer so duped: in fact, this will always be the case when authors attempt to write histories of countries which they have never seen, and depend for the authenticity of their facts upon persons who may think that it is for their interest to deceive them."

From this severe, though, perhaps, well-founded censure, on such an historian as Voltaire, we may suppose that Mr. Williams's materials are peculiarly authentic. But, as there are so many literary impostors abroad, and as booksellers even in England are sometimes guilty, not only of employing the most miserable labourers in the vineyard of compilation, but even of giving name and title to such nameless manufacturers, we cannot help regretting that the present is not more particular in identifying his person; to remove all suspicion of his being, himself, one of these anonymous compilers. That our author is a 'Squire, we doubt not. He is so by profession; every author being of course a 'Squire. That his name also may be Williams, we make no manner of scruple; but there are so many Williams's in the world; and then he has given us only the initial of his Christian name, J. Now J. may stand either for John, James, Joseph, Jacob, Joshua, Jeremy or Jedediah. Add to this, that there being no other addition to his surname than that of simple 'Squire, has in the present scribbling, sceptical age, we say, a very suspicious appearance. To remove this suspicion, with regard to ourselves, we have indeed made an enquiry after Mr. Williams, among our literary acquaintance, and also of the booksellers; who appear, to be as much in the dark as ourselves. We have also made our enquiries

of every member of the *corps diplomatique* at present resident in London; hoping, from the countenance given him at their respective courts, he might be known, at least by name, to some of the members. But to no purpose. Mr. Williams, indeed, tells us, that his primary object in travelling through the North, to *see every thing*, and to be as *little seen* as possible, will account in some degree for this privacy: and yet, unless he was furnished with Fortunatus's cap, or the *Zona Moros* Mufphonon *, we cannot readily account for his having traveled so completely *incognito*. We have no other method left, therefore, either to obviate or confirm the above suspicion, than applying to the internal evidence of the work itself. To do the author no injustice, we shall begin with his first book, relative to the Seven United Provinces of the Dutch Netherlands. Of the sources, from which he drew his information respecting the history of these provinces, Mr. Williams gives us the following account, in his preface.

"In order to form a just idea of the rise and progress of the government in the Seven United Provinces, I consulted the history of the wars and revolutions of the Low Countries, written by the Cardinal Bentivoglio, as well as those which were written by Grotius, Strada, and others; but though they concurred in giving me an idea of the violences which were used by both parties, I soon found that there was no dependence to be placed upon either of them; the Protestant writers being no less disposed to disguise the truth, when it made against their party, than the Catholics; and if the Duke D'Alva, the Cardinal Graval, and the new bishops which were elected in his time, were violent in oppressing the Protestants, the latter were no less so in counselling the leaders of their party to revenge their cause upon all the Catholics who fell into their hands: so that, like a juryman, I was obliged to form my judgment from the evidences of both parties. The history of the Stadtholders gave me some information respecting this matter.

Now, not to depreciate the historical reputation of *Bentivoglio*, *Grotius*, *Strada*, or others, we should be glad to know why the celebrated *Vaderlandse Historie* †, published within these twenty years, and accounted one of the best and most impartial histories of that country ever written, should be passed over unnoticed. Surely Mr. Williams does not mean to affront the judicious authors of that work: writers of the first estimation among the learned of their countrymen!—Rather shall we not suspect that he never heard of that production? And if so, what an opprobrium is it to this professed historian

* A capital work consisting of about 20 volumes in the original Low-Dutch; and written by several of the best writers in that language, and translated or translating at Paris into French. *Rev.*

† See the Comedy called, A Bold Stroke for a Wife.

of Holland! To a writer who avowedly declares he sat, in judgment; like a jurymen, to decide on the merits of different historians.

Again, it is but a sorry account he gives of his means of information, respecting the present state of Holland.

"For what regards the present state of Holland I am not indebted to any author, but much to the late *Monsieur* Meerman, whose candour and great knowledge were equal to his liberal and communicative disposition: he was a phenomenon in this country, and no man was better informed in what respected the laws and government of this state. I likewise received information from some of the members of the states of the different provinces, but it was thought necessary to corroborate the whole by my own observations. From the credit which I had with some of the members of the admiralty, I had the liberty to see every thing which regarded their marine in Holland and in Zealand, and even to receive every information I desired respecting the situation of it, as well as respecting the finances which are appropriated for its support.

If the information thus received was no more than the credit with the members of the admiralty, necessary to acquire it, we will venture to say, it must have been little; as the merest stranger of but a tolerable appearance in dress, and as tolerable an address, is freely admitted to see every thing which regards the marine of Holland and Zealand.—But to come to the work itself. This first book, relative to the seven provinces, is divided into seven chapters: The *first*, treating of the rise and progress of their present government: the *second*, of their present form of government: the *third*, of the religion, manners and customs of the Hollanders: the *fourth*, of their true principles and laws of commerce: the *fifth*, of the laws, customs, and policy, of the united provinces, respecting trade, manufactures and commerce: the *sixth*, of their revenues, resources, and military powers, by sea and land: the *seventh*, of the causes of the various revolutions, which have happened in this state.—In the *first* of these chapters, we have a concise abstract of the history of the Netherlands, taken, as our author confesses, from Bentivoglio, Grotius, and other writers.—In the *second*, we have as concise an account of the present form of the Dutch government. In treating this subject, the writer evidently betrays, in our opinion, his having borrowed all his information from books. It is, we think, hardly possible for a person who drew it from actual observation, on the spot, to mistake the very official titles of the principal and most common executive members of the state. Thus he gives the French appellation *Echevins* to the *Schepens*, or members of the municipal courts of justice. Again, he talks repeatedly of *din-*

cars, or sheriff's officers, whose real name is *dienaars*, or *servants*, so called from *dienen*, to *serve*. Mr. Williams also falls into some errors, respecting matters of fact, on which it is not easy for an actual traveller to stumble. Thus he tells us, that "there is no part of the *Texel*, where the water is above twenty feet deep in the middle of the channel, and that channel runs in a serpentine form through a passage which is not above a league over, and is in many places not 100 feet wide: so that if a ship by any accident is forced out of this channel, or the pilot does not conduct her properly, she is immediately aground on eight or ten feet water, and sometimes not so much."—We cannot help thinking, that Mr. Williams mistakes here the *Texel*, which is the inlet from the German ocean at the Northern part of the *Zuyder Zee*, for the *Pampus*, at the Southern part of that sea, forming the mouth of the river *Y*, leading up to Amsterdam.

Again, Mr. Williams tells us, that, upon a moderate calculation, the city of London alone pays to the Dutch people concerned in the cod and turbot fishery, one hundred and thirty pounds sterling every year, for the turbot, cod and plaice, &c. which they furnish here.—This is a very moderate computation indeed! But we are willing to think this an error of the press; which, with some others, however, ought to be corrected.

In noticing these defects, we do not mean, nevertheless, to condemn this work entirely. For though they serve to shew that the information contained in it, is such as a man need not travel for farther than to the shelves of a well-furnished library; they do not altogether convict the compiler of not having made as good an use of such library as chamber-travellers usually do. To do Mr. Williams justice, his work is far from being an injudicious or ill-written abstract of the most generally known and best esteemed histories and accounts of the countries of which he treats. To which praise only had he pretended, we should have entered no *caveat* against his claim. As he has pompously pretended, however, to the authenticity of an eye-witness and an actual observer, the justice we owe to the public, compels us to say what has been said: and though we do not cite the few instances above by way of hinting to the reader, *ex uno disce omnes*, we leave him to judge, whether a writer, who stumbles at the threshold, and is caught tripping in the very first chapter of his book, treating of a country so near home as Holland, may be supposed to proceed on a surer footing and a firmer tread when he gets farther afield.—But we must not take leave of a publication of such pomp
and

and price, without giving a specimen of the writer's stile and manner of writing. We shall do this first in his account of the Bank of Amsterdam; which is tolerably correct, though not very full, and its nature not much known in England.

"The place which contains this great treasure is a vault under the stadthoufe, made strong with all the apparatus of locks and bars and other apparent cautions of safety: there is certainly in this bank an appearance of great treasure, in bars of gold and silver, and plate; and almost innumerable bags of metals, which are supposed to be all gold and silver: in fact there ought to be all the treasure that it has received since its institution, as it gives out nothing but its credit; but this is a point which has been much disputed of late, many having affirmed, that though it does not pay orders drawn upon it in specie, and only by a transfer of credit upon its books, great sums of money are taken out of it for other purposes. The burgo-masters only have the inspection of this bank; and as no man takes any particular account of what comes in and goes out from age to age, it is impossible to make any calculation or conjecture, except by a minute inspection of the books, in what proportion the real treasure may be to the credit of it. The security therefore of this bank lies not only in the effects that are in it, which, I think, at a moderate computation, will amount to sixteen or eighteen millions of pounds sterling, but in the credit of the whole town or state of Amsterdam, the inhabitants of which being bound to make good all monies that are brought into their bank; the bills of this bank make all the great payments that are made between the merchants of this town, and in most other parts of the United Provinces; and very often considerable orders are made upon it from many other parts of the world. So that this system of treasure is properly a general deposit, where every man lodges his money, because he esteems it safer than if it were in his coffers at home; and so far is the bank from paying any interest for what is brought in, that the owner, if he do not choose to have his name entered upon the bank books for so much credit, may have the very identical bags which he delivered in, marked and numbered, whenever he chooses to call for them, on paying so much per month for their lying there in safety: but when he chooses to have his name entered upon the books for so much credit, this bank money is worth more in common payments than the common current coin in the state; as no other money passes in the bank but such coins as are well known, and whose nominal value very little surpasses their intrinsic value.

The bank has conducted very much to increase the commerce of this great city, and as it were to fix it here, for no person in trade will remove from a place where his treasure is deposited, and where this credit is not so well known, and where the use of it would be attended with great difficulties.

Of Mr. Williams's mode of reasoning on political subjects, which is frequently solid and judicious, we shall give a sample from his reflections on the laws of Holland respecting criminal refugees and civil debtors.

" Another means that has very much contributed to increase the commercial interest of this country is, that great principle of their state, which from the beginning has run through all their provinces and cities, to make their country the common refuge of all persecuted and miserable men; from whose protection no alliances, treaties, or interests, have ever been able to divert or remove them: so that, notwithstanding the great dependence this state had upon France and England, during the time of their intestine commotions, when party rage ran high, the banished, or as they thought persecuted, of both parties made this country their common asylum; nor could the States ever be prevailed with, by any instances of the respective ambassadors of those courts, to refuse them the use and liberty of common life and air under the protection of their government *.

" This firmness in the government has been one of the circumstances that has invited so many unhappy men, out of all their neighbouring states, to shelter themselves from the blows of justice or of fortune: when a stranger has acquired the title of burgher in any of their cities, he can only be judged by the laws and customs of such city.

" But I cannot forbear observing on the other hand, that many parts of the civil laws and internal policy of Holland, respecting commerce, are very imperfect, and in some instances oppressive, particularly the bankrupt laws, which are not sufficient to privilege the fair trader from the fraud and villainy of ill-disposed persons, but prevent him from taking such means to recover his property as even the laws of nature would dictate: and what is still more wonderful, whenever their courts of judicature find any imperfection in their own laws, in the decision of any matter, they have recourse to the decisions of the Roman laws in parallel cases; laws made for the government of a state, which was the very reverse of those of the republic of the United Provinces. However, considering the great imperfection of their laws, the administration of justice is very properly and impartially carried on in this state: but from this imperfection alone, many fair traders are greatly oppressed.

" The liberty of conscience in religious matters, which they allow to all foreigners who come and settle among them, does not a little contribute to draw great numbers of merchants into this state; and as soon as a foreigner is become a burgher of any of their great towns, his person and property are secure from arrests till he be convicted by due course of law, and he is equally entitled to be a member of the government with any of the most ancient burghers. Hence it is that we see one third part of the inhabitants of the province of Holland foreigners, or the descendants of foreign families, and many of them in the chief places of trust in the province. It is property here that gives a person power; and when a merchant, of a good character has

* That is, if, as our author afterwards observes, the parties purchased the privileges of a burgher; otherwise he is subject to the requisition of the Ambassador of the country of which he is a native. Of this we ourselves have known many instances. *Rev.*

enriched himself by commerce, he becomes as it were entitled to a share of the legislative authority.

"It has been observed, that when such a security as the above-mentioned is given to the persons and effects of merchants and traders, it is often injurious to trade in general, and many take advantage from it to commit all kinds of fraud and deceit: for as merchants are often obliged to entrust great sums of money, for a short time, to the hands of others, and perhaps to draw it out and replace it often, if the debtor were not constrained to fulfill his engagements by the arrest of his person, he might otherwise neglect them, and the creditor might be ruined in consequence of such neglect.

"I must again repeat, what I have observed before, that the laws of Holland are very imperfect in many particulars, of which this I have just now mentioned is one.

"Certainly it is doing a man great injustice to make him wait the tedious decisions of a court of justice to recover his money, when securing the person of the debtor by an arrest would have answered the same end; and when perhaps, for want of such a measure, the creditor by being deprived of his money must become a bankrupt. But on the other hand, the laws of Holland, thus favourable to debtors, have made her commercial towns as a kind of refuge to many half-broken merchants, who have fled there from other states; and, by purchasing the privileges of a burgher, have acquired time to recover themselves and to settle their affairs; and, by their future industry, have re-established their fortunes and credit. Hence, therefore, this lenity of the laws of Holland, with respect to debtors, has not a little contributed to draw many foreign merchants into this country, and has considerably increased its commercial interest. In all affairs which arise from ordinary civil contracts, the laws ought not to allow arresting the person, because such a power might be often vexatiously applied, and the laws should regard the liberty of one citizen to be of more moment than to gratify the caprice, or rather revenge of another."

From these short specimens, the critical reader will see that Mr. Williams expresses himself in a perspicuous, manly style, and is by no means a bad writer. He uses, indeed, now and then, a word in a sense not very idiomatical, though perhaps with philological propriety. Thus he talks of "*tolerating* cold and hunger with patience." Now, by *toleration* is generally meant a voluntary bearing or suffering any thing; as we say to tolerate a religion, &c. Again, speaking of religion, he uses the word *predominating* for *predominant*, and makes some other slips of similar immaterial import. But, *non offendimur maculis*, &c.

W.

A Letter

A Letter to the Right Honourable Willoughby Bertie, by Descent Earl of Abingdon, by Descent Lord Norreys; High Steward of Abingdon and Wallingford. In which his Lordship's Candid and Liberal Treatment of the Now Earl of Mansfield, is fully vindicated. 8vo. One Pound Scotch. Payne.

One Pound Scotch!—We remember more than once to have heard the present Chief Justice of the Court of King's-bench, very significantly add the word *sterling*, when it has been occasionally omitted, as immaterial, in the return of a verdict. Whether the present advocate, for the Now Earl of Mansfield, hath adopted his Lordship's caution, lest the English reader might mistake in the price of his publication, we presume not to determine. His own account of his motives, for this peculiar designation of its pecuniary value, is as follows.

"The rank of a commentator, and the value of a commentary, should, as to us it seemeth, bear some proportion to the dignity of the author, and the value of the work, which that Commentary is intended to elucidate. Upon this account it is, that, meaning, in the following letter, to comment on the works of a Peer, and of such a Peer, we could not condescend to affix a price in the vulgar terms of shillings and pence; but we determined that the denomination of the sum should be high, and noble. And in this we consulted the dignity of our author. But at the same time we determined to qualify that denomination by the word *Scotch*: and to this we were induced by two very cogent reasons; the first whereof is, that the subject of this part of our noble author's work is a Scotchman; and the second, that we might thereby consult the æconomy of our readers."

From this poem the reader will probably promise himself some pleasantry in the perusal of the piece itself; nor will he be disappointed: for, though our Letter-writer is not so great a master in the use of that delicate figure the irony, as a Swift, a Chesterfield, or a Jenyns, he is sufficiently shrewd, sarcastical, and severe in his satire. His wit, indeed, is too keen and his argument too poignant to accord well with the tickling pleasantry of irony. It is not easy to tickle with the talons of a tiger; though the titillating hair of the paw may cover the claws of a cat.—As the ironical vindication affected, therefore, is not compleatly kept up, we shall not dwell on it, as a meritorious composition of that kind; but select from it a *hors d'œuvre*, or less ludicrous digression respecting the propriety of the measures pursued against the Americans: the argument of which is not the less weighty for the levity with which it is treated. Unhappily we may too truly on this occasion exclaim with the Poet, "*Hæ nugæ serâ ducunt in mala.*"

"Admitting," says your Lordship, "that America did mean independency, I will now ask, Were the measures pursued the means to prevent her becoming so?" A very shrewd question, my good Lord: as pertinent is the answer—"I apprehend not." And truly, my Lord, I am most thoroughly and heartily of your Lordship's opinion. Nay, I will go farther: I will venture to say, that the Earl of Mansfield, if he would speak out, must avow himself to be of the same opinion.

"For let us apply to measures, what we have said about prophecies. Of prophecies we observed, that, though fulfilled, they might, peradventure, be not true: but, if not fulfilled, beyond all peradventure, they are false. So of measures, if the end be accomplished, they may, peradventure, not be the means of accomplishing the end; but if the end be not accomplished, beyond all peradventure, they are not the means of accomplishing that end. The application of this argument, to use the strong expression of the French, *saute aux yeux*; the fairness of it, to use a phrase of your Lordship, will not bear a dispute. It is thus men reason in the most trivial, as well as the most important, concerns: thus they judge of gamblers, as well as of prophets, and of politicians: at billiards, for instance, a man puts the mace, or the queue, in what, he thinks, the proper direction; communicates to the ball what he thinks the precise momentum required to put it into the pocket. Does he succeed? It is not a certain proof of his skill; for the ball might have a bias, the table a declivity, which he did not know; or some Bystander might move, and encrease, or diminish, the momentum, or change the direction. Does he not succeed? That is a certain proof of his want of skill. The bias of the ball; the declivity of the table, the change of the direction; the increase, or diminution, of the momentum, are not admissible in extenuation of a charge, though very admissible in detraction from applause.

"This allusion, my Lord, is not used barely to illustrate our general doctrine of measures, but applied with a more direct view to the particular measures, of which your Lordship declares, that you apprehend them not to have been the means to prevent America becoming independent. For your Lordship well knows, that at the outset, Mr. Grenville, and after him the present ministry, have been the players at this game, and we and our friends have been the bye-standers; who have changed the direction, and increased or diminished the momentum, just as it suited our purpose. For your Lordship knows, and we all know, that, from their first establishment, the Northern Colonies have aimed at independency; that the very first act of the government of Massachusetts, after the grant of their present charter, was a direct, and formal, assertion of independency; that King William, not sufficiently aware of the consequences of this attempt, thought he did enough in disallowing this act; that, gradually undeceived by subsequent attempts, his Parliaments past other acts to vindicate their own authority, and confirm the dependence of the Colonies; that from his reign to the end of the last war, there was a continual, though, to the vulgar eye, an imperceptible, struggle between Great Britain and her Colonies; the one asserting her supremacy; the other striving at independence. Soon after the close of the last war, the

the fire, which had so long been secretly kindling, had gained such a head, as to be ready, at the first breeze, to burst forth into a flame. That breeze was perhaps given by the stamp-act. Things, however, were not so far advanced; America was not yet so prepared, as to bid defiance to the power of Great Britain. Had Great Britain been as resolute and determined as America was bold and enterprising, all would have been well. America might, for a moment, have suspended, but would not have totally shaken off, the habit of acknowledging our authority. But the conduct of Great Britain was wavering, undetermined, fickle. She asserted the right; she asserted the fact; then she wavered about the right; then again the right was asserted, but the fact surrendered; then again the fact was asserted, as well as the right: but, though asserted, it never was effectually supported. And so far your Lordship is certainly founded, in declaring, what our enemies cannot deny, that the measures pursued were not the means to prevent America becoming independent.

“And this, my lord, is the highest panegyric upon the wisdom and sagacity of us, and of our friends, to whom it is owing that the conduct of Great Britain has been thus wavering, thus undetermined, thus fickle. For your Lordship may remember, that at the outset of this business, the gentle Conway, the narrative Barré, and the flannelled Pitt, excited the Colonists to resistance; rejoiced in their resistance; taught them to believe, what your Lordship’s penetration has since discovered to be a fact, that “although the force of this country might “be sufficient for conquest, ten times its force would be insufficient to “hold America in subjection:” taught them to believe, that “three “millions of people, at three thousand miles over the Atlantic, distant from the arm of power,” might safely defy the utmost efforts of that power: Your Lordship may remember, that the city Barons joined in the chorus of sedition; and told the willing Colonists—“Commands, which are given without authority, should be heard “without obedience.” Soon after the passing of the stamp-act; Mr. Grenville and his friends were removed; the honest, the disinterested Marquis, to the astonishment of all who knew him, appeared, all at once, at the helm. This short hour of administration, was, your Lordship will allow, “an hour of justice and moderation:” that this hour “did more than all the German blood-hounds, hired from all the “German traffickers in blood, in all the petty principalities of Ger- “many, can achieve in twenty years to come;” our enemies must allow; and your Lordship may, at any time, prove, by the ready obedience paid to the only act, which commanded any thing to be done by the Americans; to the only requisition, by which any thing was asked of them: And, lastly, by their grateful acknowledgement of the justice, and moderation, of the commercial regulations of the honest, the disinterested, Marquis, almost as suddenly as it had crept into them: and then the consistent Gratton, and the upright Camden, and the immutable Chatham, changed their mind; carried the tight into act, presented to the throne addresses for coercion. Anon, they too were desist; then, again the right became unconstitutional, the act

set tyrannical, coercion abominable; then again America did right to resist. An honest Mussulman believes, that, when the Emperor gives places, their prophet supplies wisdom: Our friends, my Lord, are under the guidance of a prophet, who inverts the rule of Mohammed. Are they in power? They do not very well know what they ought to do; nor what they ought to maintain. They assert the right; they abandon the right; and they take it up again; and they let it go again. Are they out of power? Then they are inspired; all their measures are infallible, success awaits upon their steps; and never leaves them, 'till they, and their measures, are put to the trial. But that, which no prophet inspires, that, which is suggested by the ready Dæmon of discord, is to excite, to cherish, to strengthen, resistance in America; is to hamper, to fetter, administration at home: And then, my Lord, what a triumph in demanding—"Are the measures, the means pursued to prevent America becoming independent!" What satisfaction in replying, with proud diffidence: "I apprehend not!" But it is something more than triumph to throw the odium of our own blunders on the shoulders of our enemies: When we, my Lord, by our weakness, and pusillanimity, "have sacrificed the highest permanent interest, and the whole majesty, power, and reputation of government," to our own "present relief;" then, my Lord, to charge all this upon our enemies; to accuse them of having done, what we did for them; of having made us "the contempt of ourselves, and the mockery of Europe." On, my Lord, this is such a triumph, as, besides ourselves, no man, I should have thought, could ever have conceived; had I not remembered, that the creative genius of a Dryden had made his spirit Melanax shake the glass of Malicorne,

—And preach on purpose

To make him lose the moment of his prayer.

To take leave of our letter-writer *, with one short specimen of his witty, though imperfect irony, we shall conclude with his own conclusion.

"And here, my Lord, I must humbly take my leave. My task is at an end. Happy if I have contributed to write down the now earl of Mansfield. But should the prepossession of the world continue; should his accursed incantations have doomed us irrevocably to herd with asses; still there is a little comfort remaining. We must leave him the

Monumentum ære perennius,

long since erected to him in the breast of every lover of loyalty, liberty, and law. We, my Lord, will apply to Dr. Wilson; the voice of Sientor you declare that you possess: to the valor of Achilles I have proved your title; and to the polite eloquence of Therites your Thoughts shall vindicate your claim. To such pretensions the good Doctor will do justice: He will erect a statue to your Lordship in ano-

* To whom, if we are not mistaken, the public are indebted for several masterly performances of the political and argumentative kind.

ther and purer Chapel of St. Stephen. There you may sweetly ogle the amiable Catharine. Vivant sanctus Willoughbeius et sancta Catharina! As the only reward for this laborious commentary, let me obtain one favour. Some Cherubs, or some Pagan Deities, will, as it becomes them, be employed to support your train or to adorn your brows. Let some corner in the group be assigned to me, my Lord: Let one single line in the inspiration point to me; and mark, that you chubby Cherub, or yon full blown Bacchus had the honour of being,

My Lord, your Lordship's

Most devoted, most faithful

Servant and Commentator.*

A Second Letter from Dr. Kenrick to Dr. Priestley, on the Nature of Matter and Spirit.*

S I R,

It gives me pain to be under the necessity of reminding a writer of your eminence, how dangerous it is to be precipitate in forming a conception of subjects, which, not only put the human understanding to the utmost stretch of comprehension, but, require long and frequent contemplation; to familiarize the ideas, which the judgment derives from the conceptions at first offered it. As, in physics, we admit of nothing but what is originally founded on the evidence of sense, and as other sciences have loaded the memory with abstract and even chimerical ideas, it follows that, in the present age of prejudice and prepossession, there is much to be *unlearned* (if I may so express myself) before we can learn any thing more in Natural Philosophy. It is with much propriety, therefore, you have taken upon you, in your introduction, to correct the notions of *Matter* and *Spirit*, as too grossly conceived by the vulgar, and too delicately refined by some late metaphysicians.

With respect to the former, you have justly exploded the notion of its being *inert* and *impenetrable*: a notion strongly inculcated by a misapplication of Sir Isaac Newton's third rule of reasoning in philosophy; and not, as you say, formed in direct contradiction to those rules†. Be yourself the judge.

Sir Isaac says, *Rule III.*

“The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all

* For the first Letter, see Appendix to the London Review, vol. VI.

† See Dr. P's *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, p. 1.

bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever."—"For, continues he, since the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as universally agree with experiments; and such as are not liable to diminution, can never be quite taken away. We no other-ways know the extension of bodies, than by our senses, nor do these reach it in all bodies; but because we perceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore we ascribe it universally to all others also. That abundance of bodies are hard we learn by experience. And because the hardness of the whole arises from the hardness of the parts, we therefore justly infer the hardness of the undivided particles, not only of the bodies we feel, but of all others. That all bodies are impenetrable, we gather not from reason, but from sensation. The bodies which we handle we find impenetrable, and thence conclude impenetrability to be an universal property of all bodies whatsoever. That all bodies are moveable, and endow'd with certain powers (which we call the *vires inertiae*) of persevering in their motion or in their rest, we only infer from the like properties observed in the bodies which we have seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and vis inertiae of the whole, result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and *vires inertiae* of the parts: and thence we conclude the least particles of all bodies to be also all extended, and hard, and impenetrable, and moveable, and endowed with their proper *vires inertiae*. And this is the foundation of all philosophy."

Will you now say, Sir, that this rule of Sir Isaac's so illustrated, and by himself applied to the *undivided and least particles* of all bodies, does not countenance and support the notion of the inertness and impenetrability of all matter?—I have said only that it is inculcated by a misapplication of this rule, for reasons deducible from the inconsistencies contained in its illustration: it is, however, a very natural misapplication, and if we judge solely from that part of the illustration above-quoted, it is no misapplication at all. The rule itself, however, applied to the primary elements of matter, is certainly fallacious. To deduce the absolute impenetrability of the constituent particles of compound bodies from the relative hardness of those bodies themselves, is an unphilosophical and futile mode of reasoning. The perceptible hardness of bodies in general, is a natural phenomenon; to account for it, therefore, by deducing it from the hardness of the parts of such bodies, is to take that for granted, which ought to be proved. It is

in effect saying no more than that *great* bodies are hard and impenetrable, because *little* bodies are hard and impenetrable. We might as well impute the transparency of diaphanous bodies to the transparency of the materials of which they are compounded; though we know that glass and other transparent bodies are compounded of particles separately opaque.—You are, yet, perfectly right, in exploding the impenetrability of the primary elements of matter; though not in pretending to do it, by rigorously adhering to Newton's rules of philosophizing*.

You are also equally right respecting the new-fangled metaphysical definition of *spirit* or *mind*: by which it is deprived of locality, and represented as having *no relation whatever to space*; so that, as you ludicrously observe, a man's mind is according to this doctrine no more in his body than it is in the moon; although, at the same time it is according to you gifted with the power of *self-motion*. But whatever hath *self-motion*, must at least be *moveable*; and if moveable, it must be capable of being removed from one place to another, and consequently of existing in some point or portion of space, of moving in some line of direction, and of thus bearing, whether in motion or at rest, some certain relation to it. Locality is, in fact, the universal mode of physical existence: nothing can exist in nature, that doth not exist *somewhere*. All created beings are, indeed, numerically distinguished by the modes of place and time; nor can any two exist separately and distinctly in one and the same place, at any one and the same time. The *ubiquity* of the *Creator* is consonant with his *unity*, and is a subject beyond the bounds of physical investigation.

I wish, Sir, I could compliment you with being equally successful, in establishing your own definitions, as in abolishing those of others. That *matter* is not the *inert, impenetrable* substance, it has been supposed to be, is a position I have myself long since maintained: That the human *soul, spirit* or *mind*, also, hath its presence in the body, and a proper motion together with it, as you affirm, is a position to which I readily subscribe. But, when you tell us that the property of *attraction* is innate and essential to the very being of matter; I deny it, for reasons that I shall hereafter give; reminding you, in the mean time, that the great advocate for uni-

* This paralogism in Sir Isaac Newton's third rule, I have frequently noticed, for many years past in various successive publications: particularly in the *Library*, and in the *Monthly* and *London Reviews*.

versal gravitation, Sir Isaac Newton himself, even while he declares that the argument from appearances, concludes more forcibly for the gravitation of all bodies than for their impenetrability, declares expressly, that "he does not affirm gravity to be essential to bodies *."—Again, when you call the soul or *spirit*, a *sensitive, thinking, substance*, with whose properties of *sensation and thought*, the *extension, attraction and repulsion of matter*, are homogeneous and compatible, I deny it, for reasons which I will also hereafter give; contenting myself, just at present, with observing that no *created spirit*, notwithstanding it be confined to space, can with propriety be termed a *substance*. Every natural phenomenon, or distinct object of sense, is a compound of *active and passive physical powers*, viz. of *matter and motion*; its *passive material part* being that substance, in consequence of whose resistance or reaction, its constituent system of motion is preserved and continued; its *active or motive part* being that combination of *directions*, which constitute such system. Every *material or passive BODY* in nature therefore, is possessed of its *motive or active SPIRIT*. In the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms, there are thus as many mineral, vegetable and animal *spirits* as there are distinct mineral, vegetable and animal *bodies*: which *spirits* also no longer actuate, agitate, or animate their respective bodies than their constituent systems of the internal motion of the *passive parts* of such bodies continue. You will say, perhaps, all this is tantamount to your own suggestion, that even *sensation and thought* are the mere result of such an organical structure as that of the brain. Be it so; we probably shall not much differ in our conclusions, when we rightly understand each other's premises. We may ultimately arrive at the same philosophical truth, though we take a different route in its investigation. Yours is a metaphysical and imaginary one; mine mechanical and real. Before I enter more particularly on the latter, however, I must proceed to shew the uncertainty and obscurity of the former.

In your first section, treating of the nature and essential properties of matter, you begin with lamenting the occasion, you have, to recur to the universally-received rules of philosophizing, as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton. The subject of your

* See the illustration of his third rule of philosophizing. Principia lib. III.—In other parts of his works, also, he speaks of it as a mechanical effect; which he certainly believed it to be; notwithstanding what Mr. Cotes has so preemprorily advanced in his mathematical preface.

lamentation, indeed, is not more singular than the mode of it.

"Though we have followed," say you, "these rules pretty closely in other philosophical researches, it appears to me that we have, without any reason in the world, intirely deserted them in this. We have suffered ourselves to be guided by them in our inquiries into the causes of particular appearances in nature, but have formed our notions, with respect to the most general and comprehensive principles of human knowledge, without the least regard, nay in direct contradiction, to them. And I am willing to hope, that when this is plainly pointed out, the inconsistency of our conduct in these cases cannot fail to strike us, and be the means of inducing the philosophical part of the world to tread back their steps, and set out again on the same maxims which they have actually followed in their progress. For my own part, I profess an uniform and rigorous adherence to them; but then I must require that my own reasoning be tried by this, and by no other test."

Would not one imagine, Sir, by all this, that you actually adhered to these universally-received rules altogether, and not by halves; adopting the two first, and, as I have shewn, exploding the third and neglecting the last! It really looks as if, thinking the former sufficient for your purpose, you had even neglected to read the latter. Could you otherwise, after professing so uniform and rigorous adherence to these rules, proceed to use almost the very words *, in which Sir Isaac

* It is asserted, and generally taken for granted, that matter is necessarily a solid, or impenetrable substance, and naturally, or of itself, destitute of all powers whatever, as those of attraction or repulsion, &c. or, as it is commonly expressed, that matter is possessed of a certain *vis inertiae*, and is wholly indifferent to a state of rest or motion, but as it is acted upon by a foreign power.

That *the vulgar* should have formed these opinions, and acquiesce in them, I do not wonder; because there are common appearances now which must necessarily lead them to form such a judgment. I press my hand against the table on which I am writing, and finding that I cannot penetrate it, and that I cannot push my hand into the place which it occupies, without first pushing it out of its place, I conclude that this table, and by analogy, all matter is impenetrable to other matter. These first appearances are sufficient for them to conclude, that matter is necessarily solid, and incapable of yielding to the impression of other solid matter.

Again, I see a billiard table; and though I observe the balls upon it ever so long, I do not find any of them ever to change their places till they are pushed against; but that when once they are put in motion, they continue in that new state till they are stopped, either by some obstacle, or their own friction, which is in fact the result of a series of obstacles. And therefore I conclude, that, had there been no obstacle of any kind in the way, a ball would have continued in that state of motion (as, without being impelled by a foreign force, it would have continued in its former state of rest) for ever; having no power within itself to make any change in either of those states. I therefore conclude universally, that all matter, as such, is entirely destitute of power, and whatever is true of larger bodies with respect to each other, must be equally true of the smallest component parts of the same body. See *Disquisitions. Sect. I.*

illustrates

illustrates his *third* rule, before mentioned, and to declare such mode of reasoning calculated only for the *vulgar* ! That the conclusions thence deduced, concerning the fundamental properties of matter, are superficial and false !—It is true that I have admitted those conclusions to be fallacious when applied to the primary elements of matter : to which it can hardly be denied the author meant to apply them ; although, in the subsequent paragraph to that above-cited, he somewhat inconsistently declares, as above hinted, that, though the argument deduced from appearances concludes with still more force for the universal *gravitation* of bodies, than even for their *impenetrability*, he does not affirm gravity to be essential to bodies : *a fortiori*, therefore, *impenetrability* may not be so. You, Sir, rejecting the essential impenetrability of matter, still maintain that *attraction* is *essential* to it, as the principle on which even its apparent solidity depends. Your arguments, if such they may be called, to prove this position, are the most curious I ever met with.

"It will appear," say you, "from the most obvious considerations, that without a power of attraction, a power which has always been considered as something quite distinct from matter itself, there cannot be any such a thing as matter ; consequently, that this foreign property, as it has been called, is in reality absolutely essential to its very nature and being. For when we suppose bodies to be divested of it, they come to be nothing at all."

"These positions, though not absolutely new," you add, "will appear paradoxical to most persons." As for myself, Sir, who, after having occasionally spent near thirty years of my life in physical lucubrations, ought not to be a stranger to the most obvious considerations, I seriously declare, that these positions are just as new as paradoxical : The whole paragraph is to me a riddle. I see no *concatenation*, as Mrs. Heideburg says, in the ideas it contains. But you beg, Sir, a candid hearing.—You shall have it.

"It will readily be allowed, that every body, as solid and impenetrable, must necessarily have some particular form or shape ; but it is no less obvious, that no such figured thing can exist, unless the parts of which it consists have a mutual attraction, so as either to keep contiguous to, or preserve a certain distance from, each other. This power of attraction, therefore, must be essential to the actual existence of all matter ; since no substance can retain any form without it."

How is this ? Do you maintain, that matter is *not* solid and impenetrable, and then *suppose* it to be so, in order to prove that its parts must possess a mutual attraction *, to support its

* Sir Isaac Newton, in supposing the existence of solid, impenetrable, figured masses of matter, supposed them to be indivisible, and saw no necessity for supposing an innate power of attraction to preserve the form of those masses, or to keep their imaginary parts together.

solidity? Is matter, in any case, a simple substance, or corpuscular element; or do you think it divisible *in fact*, as it is in *imagination, ad infinitum*? The great master, whose rules you pretend to follow, says, on this subject; "that the divided but contiguous particles of bodies may be separated from one another, is matter of observation; and in the particles that remain undivided, our *minds are able to distinguish* yet lesser parts, as is mathematically demonstrated. But whether the parts *so distinguished* and not yet divided may, by the powers of nature, be *actually divided* and separated from one another, we cannot certainly determine. Yet, had we the proof of but one experiment, that any undivided particle, in breaking a hard and solid body, suffered a division, we might, by virtue of this rule, conclude, that the undivided as well as the divided particles, may be divided and actually separated to infinity *."

Without waiting, however, for such experimental proof, you cut the gordian knot in two, and divide indivisibles, at once. "Your argument," you say,

"Equally affects the smallest atoms, as the largest bodies that are composed of them. An atom, by which I mean an ultimate component part of any gross body, is necessarily supposed to be perfectly solid, wholly impervious to any other atom; and it must also be round, or square, or of some other determinate form. But the parts of such a body (as this solid atom must be divisible, and therefore have parts) must be infinitely hard, and therefore must have powers of mutual attraction infinitely strong, or it could not hold together, that is, it could not exist as a *solid atom*."

Bless me, Sir! I took these *atoms*, the *ultimate component parts* of gross bodies, which you here tell us must be necessarily supposed to be *perfectly solid, infinitely hard, and wholly impervious* to any other atom; I took these, I say, to be the very *matter*, which you maintain to be *pervious and penetrable*; that, of which, to use your own words, you affirm "no part of it appears to be impenetrable, to other parts."—This, indeed, is paradoxical with a witness! Do the *ultimate component parts of material bodies* differ from the *primary constituent parts of material substance*? Or can they be *penetrable and impenetrable at the same time*?—I must frankly confess, Sir, that, with the best disposition in the world to comprehend you, I cannot possibly conceive what you are here about. But let us go on.

"The reason," you say, "why solid extent has been thought to be a complete definition of matter, is because it was imagined that we could separate from our idea of it every thing else belonging to it, and

† See the illustration of his 3d rule of philosophising.

leave these two properties independent of the rest, and subsisting by themselves. But it was not considered, that, in consequence of taking away attraction, which is a power, solidity itself vanishes."

It certainly was not; nor do I believe it ever entered before into the head of any man living to form such a conception.— By a power of attraction, if the word attraction have any intelligible meaning, you must mean, that property of bodies or atoms, from which results their tendency to mutual approach, when they are at a distance from each other; now, how this property can be essential to the separate existence of each, is to me inconceivable; even if it were permissible in *physics* to confound objects of the *imagination* with objects of *sense*. Mathematicians may reason justly about the infinite divisibility of extension; as about lines, figures, and other abstract ideas; but in natural philosophy we must assume *physical*, as well as *mathematical*, points, or all substance would vanish. There must necessarily subsist, between any two assignable mathematical points, an absolute line of extension, containing at least three other mathematical points; as the points assigned, unless separated by some actual distance, would not be *two* points but *one*. Is it not more philosophical, then, to presume on the existence of physical points or atoms, describing a certain portion of space, or possessing the *power of expansion* to a certain extent, than to suppose mere mathematical points, which are so many *nothings*, to be stuck together by attraction, or, as you else where term it, "plaistered together with immaterial mortar," in order to form extended bodies? But you proceed to attempt the removal of objections.

"It will perhaps be said, that the particles of which any solid atom consists, may be conceived to be placed close together, without any mutual attraction between them. But then this atom will be intirely destitute of compactness, and hardness, which is requisite to its being impenetrable. Or if its parts be held together by some foreign power, it will still be true that power is necessary to its solidity and essence; since without it every particle would fall from each other, and be dispersed. And this being true of the ultimate particles, as well as of gross bodies, the consequence must be, that the whole substance will absolutely vanish. For as the large bodies would be dissolved without some principle of union, or some *power*, internal or external, so the parts of which they are composed would, in similar circumstances, be resolved into smaller parts, and consequently (the smallest parts being resolved in the same manner) the whole substance must absolutely disappear, nothing at all being left for the imagination to fix upon."

That is in plain terms, the *large* bodies being divided into *small* bodies, the *small* bodies into *smaller* bodies, and the *smaller* bodies into the *smallest* bodies; we must return, by a retrograde progression in the degrees of comparison, and, instead of *divid-*

ing, we must *add*, or *multiply* the *smallest* into such as are only *smaller*: for how can we in the *same manner*, viz. by diminishing, *divide* the *smallest* into *still smaller*?—Surely, Sir, if there be any meaning in these metaphysical conundrums of yours, it requires the sagacity of an Oedipus to unriddle them. For my own part, I protest they are as much beyond my penetration, as the most impenetrable matter that ever the powers of attraction consolidated. But, having thus brought your argument to a *reductio ad absurdum*, I, for the present, lay down my pen; reserving farther animadversion to a future opportunity.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

W. KENRICK.

[*Letter III. in our next Review.*]

A Letter to Benjamin Franklin, L L. D. Fellow of the Royal Society. In which his Pretensions to the Title of Natural Philosopher are considered. 8vo. 1s. Bew.

It has been frequently remarked, that reputation is conferred by the public and taken away by individuals. The reason is evident; the public frequently confer reputation on the mere appearance of merit; whereas the deserving individuals, hurt by such injustice, often set on foot an enquiry which proves fatal to such ill-founded pretensions. How far this reflection is applicable in the present case, we shall not take upon us to say: thinking it behoved the letter-writer either to have made the application more particularly, or to have subscribed his own name to his assertions. Our readers will probably expect, nevertheless, a specimen of this extraordinary epistle.

“An author,” says our letter-writer, “whose reputation has been acquired by some discovery in science, and who has besides the merit of being illiterate, is in some respects out of the reach of criticism; because, in this case, things not very consistent with each other are sure to be advanced and defended. For, if he be convicted of blundering in points of learning, or should be proved ignorant of every thing done by others, in the very science to which he chooses to refer his own discoveries, his deficiencies, instead of turning to his discredit, will be considered as so many vouchers for his great abilities. Nor will his admirers rest satisfied with this, but the man himself must be reputed a prodigy, and all useful knowledge limited to his acquirements: and, in order to favour this opinion, the philosopher himself (for he can be no less) never fails to inform us, if not in direct terms, at least by broad hints, that he arrived at his present eminence, though ignorant

ignorant of many branches of learning which have been generally reputed useful.

"Such prodigies have never been favourites of mine; nor can I recollect any instance, where their writings have not convinced me, in the strongest manner, of the necessity of a regular education, for every one from whom any useful improvement in science is to be expected.

"As you are one of those self-taught philosophers, I am sufficiently sensible of the disadvantages which I labour under, in attempting to call in question your pretensions to the title of Natural Philosopher: though I might take some boldness from this consideration, that the matter in debate may be considered as capable of demonstration; and yet I shall be very much disappointed if this endeavour to set them right meet with a tolerable reception from the public.

"It may probably be asked, Why this Letter makes its appearance now, after the world have been so long in possession of your writings? The truth is, my acquaintance with them commenced but very lately; for, in the first place, I am not very fond of novelties; and, secondly, you may very easily believe that a man who has spent the greatest part of his time in the study of Newton's Principles, and the sciences necessary for understanding that book, might hear of people rubbing glass tubes without any violent curiosity about the consequences. But more especially if he had persuaded himself that Newton reaped so complete an harvest, as to leave but poor gleanings for posterity.

"But ever since the American disputes engaged so much of the public attention, we have had our ears stunned, even in the country, with the surprising discoveries of so great a Philosopher as you have been represented; and your vast abilities have been so much the topic of general conversation, that a man was hardly fit for society who had not some opinion concerning them. Though before this I trusted to report, both for your fame and your discoveries; yet now I could not think that I did justice either to you or myself, if I delayed any longer to give your writings an attentive perusal; and this (to speak in the language of news-writers) afforded me matter for various speculations, and some of them by no means agreeable: for, I am sorry to say it, I found in them what sufficiently convinced me that you are ignorant both of Philosophical Reasoning and Philosophical Principles, I mean those which have been most successfully applied to explain the appearances of nature; which grieves me the more, because, from the great reputation you and others of your stamp have acquired, it is to be apprehended we are in danger of losing every idea of true philosophy.—You no doubt perceive already that the style of this Letter will be very different from the compliments you have been accustomed to, especially when they ran so high that your modesty obliged you to conceal them, and only leave asterisks for the indulgent reader to fill up according to his imagination. Yet nevertheless I declare that I am above being actuated by party prejudice, having undertaken these strictures upon your writings, for no other reason but because I think they contain more ridiculous absurdities, under the notion of Philosophical Reasonings, than any book I know, at least that is so generally read; and that from the swarms of Philosophers we meet with every where, of the same reach and qualifications, your works may be used with great

propriety as a barometer for discovering the state of Philosophy at this present time.

"I am very sensible that this is an ungrateful employment, as it subjects a man to several imputations; for the world will not readily believe that a zeal for things in which every body has an equal concern, is not tinged with malice, or envy, or some other vicious passion. This has determined me to touch as slightly as possible upon your mistakes, and rather confine myself to such hints as may enable a reader to discover them himself, unless I shall be obliged to produce them in my own vindication. I am the rather inclinable to pursue this method, being persuaded, that if people could be prevailed upon to examine one or two philosophical questions, so minutely as to be able to form a clear notion of Newton's method of reasoning, and then compare it with yours; this would be a very probable means of removing some of those numberless corruptions which are daily creeping into Natural Philosophy: and that to such a degree as to be in danger of verifying a remark, which I used to think proceeded from the ignorance of those who made it; namely, that the Newtonian Philosophy is one of those fashionable systems which depend upon the humour of the people, and as that changes, give place to some new scheme."

If we recollect aright, the above remark is to be found in Lord Orrery's Letters to Hamilton Boyle, his son. The remark, however, is futile, and our letter-writer's censure of it well grounded. His observations on the present state of natural philosophy and philosophers are also pertinent and just.

"Every one," says he, "who observes facts, and records them faithfully, has a right to our thanks and esteem: but to consider such as Natural Philosophers, can have no other consequence than to bring the science into contempt. They may be fit to be employed as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the service of the temple, though by no means proper to be admitted to minister at the altar.

"God hath made every thing in the material world by weight and measure; and whoever pretends to comprehend any part of his works, must be well skilled in the science of magnitude and number. Causes assigned must be adequate to the effects produced by them; but if a man cannot compute the effects, all his reasonings from them are but mere conjectures, and his finest conjectures only sports of the imagination. Not but that there are certain obvious agreements and differences among things, of which our senses can judge immediately; and to ascertain which, it would be as ridiculous to apply reasoning or computation, as for a taylor to take measure for a suit of cloaths by a quadrant.

"Those people whose employment it is to class things according to their obvious shapes, sizes, or colours, used until very lately to be content with the humble appellation of Natural Historians; and their province was supposed to be confined to mere matter of arrangement, contenting themselves with a superficial view of things, without prying into the secrets of nature any farther than the discovers them to the senses of all mankind. But of late years it has become a practice, frequent

quent with these Historians, to present us with a system of the universe, and then take their seat among the Philosophers. This has been Buffon's method, who, if he had confined himself to his proper business, must have been contented with the title of Natural Historian; but no sooner has he formed our Earth and the Planets, out of Splinters, which he makes a Comet break off from the Sun, than he is immediately to be styled a Philosopher.

"A mistaken notion generally entertained concerning Experimental Philosophy, seems to have been the occasion of such authors stepping out of their road to turn Philosophers; for it is commonly supposed, that to make a few experiments and observations, and then reason about them in any manner, is sufficient to entitle one to the appellation of Natural Philosopher. But in this sense there never have been any attempts at Philosophy which were not experimental; at least, I know of none, where the authors do not reason from experiments in their manner. But unless their experiments lead to some general principle, the effects of which can be accurately computed, they cannot with any propriety be called even philosophical facts; but if the Experimentalists want either learning or abilities to trace them up to some general principle, when they lead to such, they would discover their knowledge and philosophic discernment much more by letting them rest as facts, than by introducing a jargon which is nothing to the purpose, as you have done, to give your discoveries an air of philosophical investigation.

"There is a sort of people, who have got a rage for making experiments, without the knowledge or learning necessary for making the proper use of them; who, when they have been successful in a few instances, immediately set about explaining all appearances from their experiments. Whereas, if they had learning, the failures of others would have taught them modesty; and a knowledge of the proper method of investigation, would have discovered the absurdity of their own proceedings."

A Philosophical and Religious Dialogue in the Shades. Between Mr. Hume and Dr. Dodd. 4to. 2s. Hooper and Davis.

We can say little more of this publication than is said in the advertisement prefixed to it.

"Mr. Hume and Dr. Dodd are two singular and opposite characters. Their extensive abilities, their dissimilar opinions, morals, and fortunes, form a striking contrast. Though this dialogue contains nothing so profound as the reader might perhaps naturally expect; it may furnish a slight antidote against the pernicious influence of the opinions of the one, and of the morals of the other. Mr. Hume is a splendid and interesting object to the eye. The memory of Dr. Dodd, it must be confessed, does not fill the imagination with grateful ideas, but it affords us matter of serious reflection."

The History and Antiquities of the Counties of Westmorland and Cumberland. By Joseph Nicolson, Esq; and Richard Burn, L L. D. 2 Vols. 4to. 2l. 2s. Cadell.

This, like the history of other counties or districts, is so miscellaneous and even heterogeneous a work, that it cannot be subjected to the usual rules of criticism. It is absolutely incapable of abridgement or abstract; a few extracts is all it will admit of. Industry in collecting, fidelity in transcribing, and judgement in selecting and arranging the materials, is the utmost that can be expected from the authors or editors (call them which you will) of such a performance. We shall content ourselves at present, with laying before our readers the account of the design and execution of the work, as set forth in the preface: in some future number we may perhaps entertain them with some of its most curious articles.

“ Various collections have been made from time to time by inquisitive and learned men, concerning the history and antiquities of the Counties of Westmorland and Cumberland, some with an intention of publication, others to gratify private curiosity.

“ By the favour of the present proprietors, these are now collected, digested, and offered to the public view: it being judged more eligible that the following work should come abroad in its present state, however imperfect, than to wait for further information, whilst the present materials are perishing.

“ The Right Rev. Dr. William Nicolson, Lord Bishop of Carlisle (whom we mention in the first place), made a collection of materials towards a general history of the said two counties; consisting of, 1. A topographical description and history of the county of Cumberland. 2. A collection from books, manuscripts, and records, for an history of the bishops, priors, deans, and chapter of Carlisle. 3. Collections for a monasticon of the said diocese. 4. History of all the rectories and vicarages in the diocese of Carlisle, extracted chiefly from the registers of the several bishops at Rose. 5. Miscellany account of the state of the Churches, parsonage and vicarage houses, and other things remarkable, in the several parishes within the diocese of Carlisle, taken in his parochial visitation in the year 1703. All these are now at Hawkdale, in the possession of his nephew Joseph Nicolson, Esq; Transcripts of several of these, in four folio volumes, the said learned prelate caused to be deposited in the library of the dean and chapter of Carlisle.

“ Towards the ecclesiastical part of so much of the two counties as lies within the diocese of Chester, we have received assistance from Bishop Gastrell's manuscript account of the said diocese of Chester, with continuations by the late Commissary Stratford; now in the possession of Mr. James Collinson of Lancaster.

“ Mr. John Denton of Cardew, made large extracts from the Escheators books for Cumberland, and from the records in the tower and other public offices; containing accounts of fines levied, pleas of lands,

History and Antiquities of Westmorland and Cumberland. 71

lande, inquisitions *post mortem*, grants of fairs and markets, parks, free warren, and many other particulars. Copies of which extracts are now at Rydal-hall in the possession of Sir Michael Le Fleming, Bart. From the said extracts Mr. Denton compiled his manuscript history of Cumberland, which is in several hands.

“ Sir Daniel Fleming of Rydal, bart. great grandfather of the said Sir Michael, made very large collections relating to both counties; and from his family evidences, which have been accumulating almost ever since the conquest, he formed a manuscript history of his own family (and incidentally of divers other families), in two volumes quarto. Amongst his other collections (besides the abovesaid copies from Mr. Denton) are many pedigrees of ancient families, marriage settlements, inquisitions *post mortem*, extracts from the records at London and from the Bodleian library at Oxford, and decrees in courts of equity on matters arising within the said two counties. He also writ a small manuscript history of Westmorland; one copy whereof is at Rydal, and another in the Bodleian library.

“ The Right Honourable Anne Countess Dowager of Pembroke, Dorset, and Montgomery, at a vast expence, procured from all the public offices copies of every thing that could be found relating to any of her ancestors the Veteriponts and Cliffords, lords of Westmorland, and hereditary sheriffs of the same; and caused the said copies to be engrossed in three large folio volumes, and lodged in her castle at Appleby, where they now remain. In making this collection, she employed that learned antiquary Mr. Roger Dodsworth, who left a large collection of manuscripts to the university of Oxford. From these records she caused to be compiled an history of her ancestors, from the first Robert de Veteripont in the reign of King John, down to her own time: in the digesting of which memoirs she employed that great and learned lawyer Mr. Hale, afterwards lord chief justice.

“ The Rev. Thomas Machel, M. A. sometime fellow of Queen's College in Oxford, and rector of Kirby Thore, from his first entrance in the University to the day of his death, employed himself with unwearied assiduity in collecting materials for an history of Westmorland; and, as his collections multiplied, an history also of Cumberland. At his death, he left his collection to the aforesaid Bishop Nicolson, with a request (if it might easily be done) that his papers should be put into form and published. This collection, the bishop says in a prefatory introduction, was all in loose papers; and so imperfect and indigested, that he could not think of completing the design. But he gathered all the scattered fragments together, and bound them up in six volumes in folio, and lodged the same in the library of the Dean and Chapter of Carlisle, that they might be made use of, if any person afterwards should undertake an history of the said two counties. This collection of Mr. Machel consists, first, of extracts from the evidences at Appleby-Castle, and at Skipton Castle (another feignory belonging to the Lords of Westmorland.) Next, Mr. Machel by himself, and by divers amanuenses, made very large extracts from the records in the Rolls chapel and in the Tower; unto which he had free access by the friendship of Sir Joseph Williamson, secretary of state; who had formerly been fellow of the aforesaid college. He also made ex-
tracts

tracts from the private evidences of several ancient families; which extracts are become more valuable, as many of the originals are now lost. Mr. Machel has also consulted the records in the Heralds-office, and the separate collections of several particular heralds, and especially of Sir William Dugdale, his intimate friend. It was usual in ancient time for the heralds to perambulate the several counties at certain intervals, where they received and examined the pedigrees of the several families, approved the genuine, rejected the spurious, and respite the doubtful for further consideration, blazoned their arms, granted new bearings to new families, or new marks of distinction to different branches of the same ancient family. The last visitation of that kind in Westmorland and Cumberland was made by the same Sir William Dugdale in the years 1664 and 1665; and Mr. Machel received copies from him of all the particulars. But above all, the said Sir William Dugdale had made a collection in 62 volumes in folio and quarto, of matters relating to different parts of the kingdom. From thence Mr. Machel hath copied all that related to the said two counties.

“The Rev. Hugh Todd, D. D. Vicar of Penrith and Prebendary of Carlisle, composed an historical description of the diocese of Carlisle, in a large folio manuscript, and intended the same for publication; but was prevented by the most obvious of all reasons, namely, waiting for further materials. Hence it hath happened, that there is no account in his manuscript from what fountains he derived his information: and in fact, many of his accounts, when compared with the records of ancient times, appear to have wanted a re-consideration. Nevertheless, he was a gentleman of ability and learning, and there are many things in his collection both curious and instructive.

“Sir Thomas Carleton, of Carleton-hall, made divers extracts from the public offices relating to Cumberland and Westmorland, and writ large notes on some of Mr. Denton’s extracts; and particularly, there is a large and curious collection of letters, which he says were found in the library at Carleton-hall after his grandfather’s death, relating to the border service, during the time that Lord Daere was warden of the West-marches, in the reign of king Edward the sixth: which particulars make part of the valuable collection at Rydal-hall.

“Christopher Rawlinson, of Cark-hall, in the county of Lancaster, Esq. left a large collection of manuscripts, in which are many particulars relating to the counties of Westmorland and Cumberland. Copies of these are also at Rydal.

“James Bird, of Brougham, Esq. who had been steward at Appleby-castle, made a collection in alphabetical order of matters relating to the several townships or manors in Westmorland, holden of the said Castle, from the same materials which Mr. Machel had made use of before: and there are in Mr. Bird’s collection some inquiries and other evidences, which had not fallen under Mr. Machel’s inspection. This Mr. Bird appears to have had a most ample repository of old evidences; but after the strictest enquiry, nothing hath been found now remaining, save only the above-mentioned alphabetical digest, preserved from oblivion by the aforesaid Sir Daniel Fleming.

"To all these we may add the original Chartularies of the several religious houses of Holme-Cultram, Wetheral, and Lanercost; the first of these at Hawksdale, the second in the library of the dean and chapter of Carlisle, and the third at Naward Castle, belonging to the right honourable the earl of Carlisle. As also the registers of the several bishops of Carlisle, at Rose, from the year 1293 to the present time, but with several intermissions, especially during the long and dreadful contest between the two houses of York and Lancaster. These ecclesiastical registers are extremely useful, even on a temporal account, in helping to rectify the heraldic pedigrees of ancient families; for, as most of the great men were patrons of advowsons, the history of the incumbents helps to elucidate the succession of their patrons.

"But our greatest curiosity is a folio manuscript (at Hawksdale) of Richard Bell, in the reign of queen Elizabeth, warden clerk of the West-Marches of England, over against Scotland; which, above all our other materials, affords the fullest and most satisfactory account of the ancient state of the borders, and consequently of that remarkable and extraordinary tenure of border service, with which the customs of every manor throughout both the counties are most intimately connected.

"It would be tedious to recount all the assistances we have been favoured with from individuals: These will more properly be noticed in their respective places.

[To be continued.]

The Excellency of the Gospel, as suited to the Poor—Preached at Salter's Hall, April 11, 1777, before the Correspondent Board in London of the Society in Scotland (incorporated by Royal Charter) for propagating Christian Knowledge in the Highlands and Islands, and for spreading the Gospel among the Indians in America. By Andrew Kippis, D.D. 8vo. 1s. Cadell.

A suitable and persuasive exhortation to the rich, to contribute liberally, to enable the present preachers of the Gospel, to dispense their knowledge to the poor.—Christ preached his gospel to the poor *gratis*; and so, we presume, would our modern divines, if they did not live by their profession. Since sermonizing, however, has become a trade, the majority of our divines preach, as our counsel at the bar plead, coldly enough for such christians and clients as apply to them *in forma pauperis*.

* *

Sermons on the Ten Commandments. By Samuel Ogden, D. D. Woodwardian Professor in the University of Cambridge. 8vo. 6s. Cambridge printed, London sold by Beecroft, &c.

These discourses are in number twenty-three; the subjects interesting, the manner of treating them striking and spirited. They are so judiciously calculated, also, in point of length, that they will tire the patience of no reader, nor raise any suspicion, of dinner being spoiled, in the auditors of their delivery.

* *

A Delineation of the Parables of our Blessed Saviour: to which is prefixed, A Dissertation on Parables and Allegorical Writings in general. By Andrew Gray, D. D. 8vo. 4s. Murray.

These parables are divided into three classes; the first comprehending such as relate to the nature and progress of the gospel dispensation; the second such as respect the rejection of the Jews and the calling of the Gentiles; the third to such as convey moral instructions. The prefixed dissertation is an excellent tract, and displays the hand of a master.

* * *

The Errors of the Church of Rome detected, in ten Dialogues between Benevolus and Sincerus. To which is added, A brief Vindication of the Revolution, and subsequent Settlement of the Crown on the illustrious House of Hanover. By the Rev. James Smith, Vicar of Alkham and Chapel and Rector of Eastbridge in Kent. 8vo. 5s. Johnson.

Mr. Smith, it seems, is a convert from the Church of Rome, and at present, as we are above informed, a clergyman of the Church of England. These circumstances suggest, that he has had an opportunity of making himself fully master of the points in controversy between them. It is, however, difficult for the most knowing and ingenious writer to advance any thing new on a subject so often treated.

* *

Here

Horæ Solitariae: or Essays upon some remarkable Names and Titles of Jesus Christ, &c. 8vo. 6s. Dilly.

We have a homely English proverb, which says, "As the fool thinks, the bell chinks;" a proverb applicable, in our opinion, to all arguments founded on the sound and arbitrary meaning of words.

* *

A Discourse on Repentance. By Thomas Mole. 8vo. 2s. Johnson.

Mr. Mole appears to be not altogether orthodox in his notions of repentance; for though repentance be the *sine qua non* of forgiveness, it is not represented in the gospel as the cause of it. Were it so, God's grace would not be, as it is said to be, a *free gift*.

* *

The Principles of the Christian Religion compared with those of all the other Religions, and Systems of Philosophy, which have hitherto appeared in the World. By J. Stephens, Esq. 8vo. 4s. boards. Doddsley.

An interesting and entertaining performance; exhibiting a general sketch of the principal systems of religion, that have made their appearance in different ages of the world; and displaying the great superiority of the *Christian*. As to the systems of philosophy, it might have been as well, if the pretensions of Christianity to Philosophy had been omitted.

"For, though read Alexander Ross over,
"One may not be a sage philosopher."

* *

Youth's Monitor.—On the Death of Mr. John Parsons. Preached Aug. 17, 1777, at St. Sepulchre's, by C. De Cost-logon, A. M. 8vo. 6d. Buckland, &c.

A pious, though trite, remonstrance with youth, on the probability of being taken off in the prime of life, and the religious expediency, therefore, of their living prepared for so awful an event.

* * *

The Religious Improvement of Awful Events. A Sermon preached at Blackley, Sept. 21, 1777, on Occasion of a Shock of an Earthquake. To which is prefixed, the Theory of Earthquakes, by John Pope. 4to. 1s. 6d. Johnson.

The Earth did quake, says St. Matthew, Chap. xxvii. v. 51: from which words the preacher takes occasion of the religious and moral use that should be made of such events.—In the Essay, on the physical causes of earthquakes, prefixed, the ingenious author adopts the best modern system, and displays a competent knowledge of the subject.

* *

A Sermon preached to a Congregation of Protestant Dissenters at Nottingham, Dec. 13, 1776, being the Day appointed for a General Fast. By George Walker. 8vo. 1s. Johnson.

Mr. Walker gives a very gloomy picture of the religion and morals of the age. It is doubtless bad enough in both respects, but we hope not quite so bad as here represented. If it be, we fear that even fasting will go but a little way in amending it.

* * *

A Ser-

A Sermon preached at Whitehall Chapel, at the Consecration of the Right Rev. Father in God, Beilby, Lord Bishop of Chester, Feb. 9, 1777. By John Briggs, M. A. Published by Command of his Grace the Lord Archbishop of York. 8vo. 1s. Payne.

An illustration of the importance and utility of the office of a Christian minister; a character, however, which he appears desirous of confining to the clergy of the established Church.

* * *

A Sermon preached at the Ordination of the Rev. Sir Harry Trelawney, Bart. and A. B. (late of Christ Church, Oxford) to the Pastoral Office in the Church of West Looe, Cornwall. Preached at Southampton, April 22, 1777, by Edward Ashburner, A. M. Together with an Introductory Discourse and Questions proposed by William Kingsbury, A. M. Sir Harry Trelawney's Answers and Confession of Faith. And the Exhortation to him, by John Crisp. 8vo. 1s. Vallance, &c. Sold also at the Tabernacle Moorfields, and at Tottenham Court Chapel.

Sir Harry Trelawney, we are told, is a man of fortune, as well as family, and therefore is regarded as an extraordinary acquisition by the dissenters: who have gained him over, as they call it, from the Church. We are sorry to see so poor an occasion of triumph so eagerly embraced, in those who affect to think the things of this world so little connected with those of the other.—The young man seems to be well meaning, but not so circumspect as he may possibly wish hereafter he had been on the present occasion.

* * *

A Sermon in which the Doctrine of the Trinity is stated, proved, and defended. In Jewry-Street Chapel Aldgate, May 23, 1777, by W. Aldridge. 6d. Bell near Aldgate.

Mr. Aldridge may believe the doctrine of the Trinity on very good grounds, himself; but we believe they are such as he will not readily communicate to others, by any mode of stating, proving, and defending it, in the way of controversial argument.

* * *

Impressure

Imposture detected, and the Dead vindicated: in a Letter to a Friend, containing some gentle Strictures on the false and libellous Harangue, lately delivered by Mr. John Wesley, upon his laying the first Stone of his new Dissenting Meeting-House, near the City Road. By Rowland Hill, M. A. 8vo. 6d. Matthews.

If Mr. Wesley's harangue was libellous, the present letter is no less so. We hardly remember, indeed, to have before met with such a collection of Billingsgate abuse in print. We have had instances of Mr. Hill's zeal outrunning his judgement, but we did not, before, think him such an adept in the oratory of the vulgar tongue.

• • •

A Reply to Mr. Hill's Imposture detected. By John Wesley, A. M. 8vo. Foundery.

Old Master John is a sly one; and, though at the bottom, perhaps, not a barrel has the better herring, he hath the advantage of his opponent in experience and temper: and has therefore by much the best of the present dispute.

* * *

The Devil upon Two Sticks; a Comedy of three Acts, as it is performed at the Theatre Royal in the Haymarket. Written by the late Samuel Foote, Esq. 8vo. 1s. 6d. Wheble.

The Maid of Bath; a Comedy of three Acts, as it is performed at the Theatre Royal in the Haymarket. Written by the late Samuel Foote, Esq. 8vo. 1s. 6d. Wheble.

The Coxeniers; a Comedy of three Acts, as it is performed at the Theatre Royal in the Haymarket. Written by the late Samuel Foote, Esq. 8vo. 1s. 6d. Wheble.

Of the above three comedies, we shall only observe at present, that they are printed correctly and *verbatim* as they are acted:

acted: of which the reader, who may have attended their representation, will judge from the following scene; which some may think the Editor might have excuseably omitted, as the principal object of the Satire has severely paid the debt due to justice and to Nature.

Mrs. Fleece'm, Flaw, and Mrs. Simony.

Mrs. Sim. Madam, I am your obedient and very devoted; Mr. Flaw, I am entirely yours. Ten thousand pardons for waiting upon you in this dishabille; but I staid so late last night at Lady Lurch'em's assembly, that I have had but just time to huddle on my things: and—nor have I now five minutes to spare; as I promised precisely at twelve to call on Lady Frolick, to take a turn in Kensington Gardens, to see both the Exhibitions, the Stained Glass, Dwarf Giant, and Cox's Museum. Mr. Flaw, I presume, has mentioned our little affair; the Doctor would have waited on you himself, but men hum and ha, and are so round about, aukward and shy; now I am always for coming plump to the point. Besides, women best understand one another, you know: but as I was saying, the Patron of the business in question, is, as we understand, a near friend, and relation of yours.

Mrs. Flee. Madam, I shall be happy to—

Mrs. Sim. Your patience, Madam, for I have not a moment to spare. Now, as it can't be suppos'd, that some people should do favours for other people, with which people those people are not acquainted, I am ready to advance; for the Doctor knows nothing about it; quite ignorant.

Mrs. Flee. How Madam! I understood—

Mrs. Sim. The Doctor! Not he, I assure you, Madam; entirely ignorant in every respect. Now if such a favour can be obtained, I am ready to deposite; as Mr. Flaw has doubtless informed you.

Mrs. Flee. Why—I can't say, Madam, But it is very handsome.

Mrs. Sim. Nay, Madam, the party will lose no credit, by doing what is desired; the Doctor's powers are pretty well known about town; not a more *populous* preacher within the sound of Bow bell; I don't mean for the mobility only; those every canting fellow can catch: the best people of fashion are not ashamed to follow the Doctor; nor one, madam, of the humdrum, drawling, long winded tribe; he never crams congregations, gives them more than they can carry away; not above ten or twelve minutes at most.

Mrs. Flee. Indeed!

Mrs. Sim. Even the Dowager Dutchess of Drowsy, was never known to nod at my Doctor's—and then he does not pore with his eyes close to the book, like a clerk that reads the first lesson, not he; but all extemporary, Madam. With a cambric handkerchief in one hand, and a diamond ring on the other; and then he waves this way, and that way, and he curtesies, and he bows, and he bounces, that all the people are ready to—But then his wig, Madam, I am sure you must admire his dear wig; not with the bushy brown buckles dangling and dragging, like a Newfoundland spaniel; but short, rounded off at the ear,

ear, to shew his plump cherry cheeks, white as a curd, feather-topp'd, and the curls as close as a colliflower.

Mrs. Flee. Why, really, Madam—

Mrs. Sim. Then my Doctor is none of your scismatics, Madam; believes in the whole thirty-nine, and so he would if they were nine times as many.

Mrs. Flee. Very obedient.

Mrs. Sim. Obedient! as humble and meek as a curate; does duly his duties, never scruples to bury though it be but a tradesman; unless he happens to be better engaged.

Mrs. Flee. Why, with all these great qualities, I should think our success must be certain.

Mrs. Sim. With your assistance Madam, I have not the least doubt in the world; so, Madam, begging your pardon for having intruded so long, I leave Mr. Flaw and you to confer on the subject. Not a step I beseech you; Lord bless me, I had like to have forgot; my memory, as the Doctor says, is so very tenacious it is not one time in twenty I can remember the text. Besides all I have said, my Doctor, Madam, possesses a pretty little poetical vein; I have brought you here a little hymn in my pocket.

Mrs. Flee. Madam, you are very—

Mrs. Sim. Of which the Doctor desires your opinion.

Mrs. Flee. Hymn! Then the Doctor sings, I presume.

Mrs. Sim. Not a better pipe at the play-house; he has been long notorious for that: then he is as cheerful, and has such a choice collection of songs; why he is constantly ask'd at the great city feasts: and does, I very believe, more in-door christenings than any three of the cloth. But this composition, madam, is of a different kind; it is but short: but if the party, your worthy friend and relation, should happen to like the manner of writing, he has much longer for his immediate perusal. Madam, I am your obsequious and very devoted—Not a step, my good Mr. Flaw; my chairmen are, you know, in waiting. [Exit.]

Mrs. Flee. A hymn! what the deuce can the woman mean by a hymn? Let me see—"Promise to pay to the bearer, one hundred pounds for the Governor and Company"—Ay, marry, this is coming plump to the business; no man can deny, Mr. Flaw, but these lines are sterling; if the Doctor's prose is as good as his poetry, I don't wonder he has so many admirers.

THEATRICAL ARTICLE.

No fewer than three new Tragedies have appeared on the stage since our last article; viz. *The Roman Sacrifice*, written by Mr. Shirley, author of *Edward the Black Prince*, *Electra*, &c.—*Alfred*, written by Mr. Home, author of *Douglas*, *Agis*, &c.—And *The Battle of Hastings*, written by Mr. Cumberland, author of the *West Indian*, &c.—As neither of them, however, have as yet appeared in print, though, as we are informed, designed to be soon printed, we defer our observations on them till they are published.